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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW*
This is a review of important decisions handed down by the
Supreme Court of North Dakota during 1981. The purpose of this
review is to serve as a convenient overview of important decisions
and, in some cases, as a summary of the effect that these decisions
will have on North Dakota law. Not all decisions from this period
are discussed; only those that may have significant impact on North
Dakota law are included.
The review is divided into the following subjects:
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Bromley v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
In Bromley v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau' the
supreme court addressed the issue of what the duties,
responsibilities, and functions of the Workmen's Compensation
Bureau (Bureau) are in making initial determinations on a claim.
2
A claimant, Bromley, contended that the Bureau acted improperly
when it denied his claim for disability and medical benefits because
the Bureau relied upon medical reports that contained unresolved
discrepancies. 3 In reversing the Bureau's decision4 the court ruled
that the Bureau has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts
to clarify discrepancies in medical records it relies upon in making
its decisions.5 The court reasoned that the responsibility for
resolving inconsistencies arises from the Bureau's investigation
duties. 6 The court also ruled that if inconsistent parts of an
administrative record are not clarified, an agency's final decision,
which is in accord with only part of the record, is not supported by
a preponderance of the evidence. 7
Barnes County v. Garrison Diversion Conservancy District
In Barnes County v. Garrison Diversion Conservancy District8 the
supreme court considered the appropriate nature or scope of
judicial review in a statutorily authorized de novo review9 of a state
administrative decision.10 The issue arose when the district court
reversed the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District decision
denying Barnes County's application to withdraw from the
conservancy district." Barnes County's appeal to the district court
1. 304 N.' .2d 412 (N.I). 1981).
2. Bromley v, North Dakota Workmcn's Compensation Bureau, 304 N W.2d 412. 416 (N.D.
1981).
3. Id. at 415.
4 Id. at 418.
5. Id. at 416-17.
6. Id. at 416.
7. Id. at 418.
8. 312 N.W.2d 20(N.D. 1981)
9. See 5 P. NI.zFiNtsJ. J STFIN & .1. GR'F, A tMINISt'RATIVE LAW § 51.04 (1981). "In g(envral.
juditial reviewx of agency determinations is limited to an examination of the agt'n 'y rc'ord. Dr nom,
review, in contrast. allows the reviewing Court tiot only to examine the record. but to make its own
independent findings of fact. " Id, (footnotes omitted).
10. Barnes Count' v. Garrison Diversion Conservancy Dist., 312 N.W.2d 20. 24 (N.). 1981)
1I 1.Id. at 23-24.
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was treated as an "original suit" pursuant to section 61-24-17 of
the North Dakota Century Code' 2 and, therefore, new testimony
and issues not raised at the administrative hearing were raised in
the district court trial. '
3
The supreme court reversed the district court's judgment and
affirmed the determination of the Conservancy District. 14 The
court held that under the separation of powers clause of the North
Dakota Constitution 5 it is an unconstitutional encroachment upon
administrative agency functions for the judiciary to rehear evidence
or to hear new evidence not heard by the agency "where a
transcript of the proceedings before the agency is available" and
unchallenged.' 6 The court further stated that all statutes that
authorize judicial review of administrative decisions must be
construed to limit the judiciary's role to that of "review" of the
administrative proceeding and to avoid constructions which would
allow a judge to substitute his judgment for that of an
administrative agency. 7
Teegarden v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
The court in Teegarden v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Bureau 8 addressed the issue of the time period within which an
employee must file a claim for compensation with the Workmen's
Compensation Bureau (Bureau) when his disability cannot be
traced to a specific accident or incident.' 9 The Bureau denied
benefits to the appellant-claimant, Teegarden, on the ground that
his claim was not filed, as required by section 65-05-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code, 20 within one year after he knew or should
12. N D. Ci CODF. 61-24-17 (1960), The statute provides that on appeals from orders of the
conservancy district, the district court "shall have and exercise original jurisdiction and shall hear
and determine the cause de novo without a jury.' Id.
13- 312 N.W.2d at 24.
14. ld, at 27-28.
15. N.I). CONST. art. VI, § 10.
16. 312 N.W.2d at 25.
17. Id. at 21, 25. The court previously held that where no record is available of the admin-
istrative agency proceeding, the trial court is allowed to consider other evidence in a trial
anew. Shaw v. Burleigh County. 286 N.W.2cd 792. 796 (N.D. 1979). The standard of revicv by the
trial court, however, is still that ofdceterntining whether the agency acted properly; the court may not
suhstiiule its judgment for that of the agency. Munch v. City of Moni, 311 N.W.2d 17, 22 (N.).
198!).
18. 3 13 N.W. 2d 716 (N.D. 1981).
19. Teegarden v, North Dakota Workmen's Compensation lurau. 3 13 N.W,2d 716. 717-18
(N.I). 1981).
20. N. D. C ExT. CODE § 65-05-01 (Supp. 1981). The statute provides in part:
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have known that his injury was related to employment. 2'
In reversing the Bureau's decision, the court interpreted
section 65-05-01 to condition the running of the claim period on a
subjective standard of reasonableness.2 2 The court held that when
the actual date of injury cannot be determined with certainty, the
one year period for filing a claim does not begin to run until the
claimant, in light of his education, intelligence, and knowledge,
knows or reasonably should know that his injury is work-related.
23
Applying this standard to the Teegarden claim, the supreme court
found that the Bureau's decision was not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence. 24 The court reasoned that because
the claimant had no knowledge or training in medicine, and had
sought medical help but had not been informed that his injury may
have been work-related, and because the claimant's injury was of a
type common to the general public, the claimant's failure to
recognize his injury as work-related was reasonable.
25
Happy Day Day Care Center v. Social Service Board
In Happy Day Day Care Center v. Social Service Board2 6 the
supreme court affirmed a Burleigh County district court judgment
dismissing Happy Day Day Care Center's (Center) appeal for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 27 The Center appealed a decision of
the Social Service Board of North Dakota (Board) based on
recommendations of a hearing officer and on evidence and
testimony introduced at a hearing in Ward County revoking the
All original claims for compensation shall be filed within one year after the injury
or within two years after the death. The date of injury for purposes of this section shall
be the actual date of injury when such can be determined with certainty by the
claimant and bureau. When the actual date of injury cannot be determined with
certainty the date of injury shall be the first date that a reasonable person knew or
should have known that the injury was related to employment. No compensation or
benefits shall be allowed under the provisions of this title to any person, except as
provided in section 65-05-04, unless he or she, or someone on his or her behalf, shall
file a written claim therefor within the time specified in this section.
Id.
21. 313 NV.2d at 717.
22. Id. at 718. The court expressly rejected the argument that the expression "reasonable
person" in section 65-05-01 of the North Dakota Century Code required the claimant's conduct to
be judged against an o*jective uniform standard of behavior. the "reasonable man" from tort law.
Id. (citing 3 A, LARSON. THF LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMsPENSATION, 5i 78.41 at 15-91. 1,5-92 (1976)).
Instead. the court found that the proper "test for initiating the running of the claim period was a
subjective test: Whether the claimant, in light of his internal character, should have known that his
injury w.as traceable to his work." 313 N.W.2d 718. See supra note 20 for the statutory lanfguage of
section 65-05-01 of the North Dakota Century Code.
23. 313 N.W.2d at 718.
24. Id. at 720.
25. Id. at 719-20.
26. 313 N.W.2d 768 (N.D. 1981).
27. Happy Day Day' Care Center '. Social Serv. Bd.. 313 N.W.2d 768. 771 (N.D. 1981).
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Center's license to operate a day care center. 28 Section 28-32-15 of
the Administrative Agencies Practices Act 29  gives territorial
jurisdiction to the district court of the county in which an
administrative "hearing or part thereof" is held on the subject
matter of the appeal. 30 The issue confronting the court in Happy
Day was whether the deliberations by the Board in Burleigh County
constituted a "hearing or part thereof. "31
The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the Center's
interpretation of the word "hearing" and held that the Board's
meetings in Burleigh County, reviewing the previously prepared
recommendations and hearing transcript, did not constitute a
"hearing or part thereof." ' 32 The Burleigh County district court,
therefore, did not have subject matter jurisdiction. 33 The court
reasoned that the administrative agency's decision-making process
contemplates two separate and distinct functions, a "hearing" and
a final "decision" meeting. 34 The court further stated that the term
hearing only "include[s] those functions at which evidence is
presented and testimony is given."
35
Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen
In Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen36 the court held that the
North Dakota Public Service Commission (PSC) must treat a retail
electric utility company's wholesale rates, filed with or fixed by the
Federal Energ, y Regulatory Commission (FERC), as actual and
28. Id. at 768-69. The administrative procedure at issue in this case developed as follows:
Center. a day care center in Minot (Ward County) was informed in March of 1980 of the Board's
intent to revoke their license. In April and May of 1980 a four day hearing was held in Minot before
an appeals review supervisor. After the hearing the referee sent his recommendations and the
hearing record to the Board in Bismarck (Burleigh County). The Board, after two meetings in
Bismarck, accepted the referee's recommendation to revoke the license of the center. Center then
appealed the Board's decision in district court in Burleigh County. Id. at 769.
29. N.D. CENT, Cooc S 28-32-15 (1974). The statute provides in part:
Any party to any proceeding heard by an administrative agency, except in cases
where the decision of the administrative agency is declared final by any other statute.
may appeal from such decision within thirty days after notice thereof has been given.
or ifa rehearing has been requested as provided herein and denied, within thirty days
after notice of such denial has been mailed to him. Such appeal mat' be taken to the district
court designated b, law,. and if none is dcsignated, then to the district court of the county' tiherein the
hearing or a part thereof was held.
Id. (emphasis added).
30. 313 N.W.2d at 770 (citing Wagner v. North Dakota Bd. of Barber Examiners. 186 N.V.2d
570 (N.D. 1971)).
31. 313 N.W.2d at 770.
32. Id. at 771.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The court also stated that the presentation of a written or oral '-argument" to an agency
is not an administrative hearing ftnction. Id.
36. 314 N.W.2d 32 (N.D. 1981).
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reasonable operating expenses 37 for purposes of fixing intrastate
retail rates. The court concluded that because FERC has exclusive
jurisdiction over a utility's interstate wholesale rates, the exclusive
procedures for attacking the propriety of those expenses are the
remedies available in a proceeding before FERC.
38
The North Dakota Supreme Court based its decision on the
supremacy clause 39 of the United States Constitution."0 First, the
court determined that, based on the Federal Power Act, "FERC
has the exclusive authority to regulate all wholesale sales [of
electricity] in interstate commerce except those which Congress has
made explicitly subject to state regulations. Individual states have
the authority to regulate local retail rates to the ultimate.
consumer." 4 1 Next, the court rejected the PSC's argument that it
had not crossed the "bright line" between state and federal
jurisdiction when it investigated the reasonableness of FERC's
findings while regulating intrastate retail rates.42  The court
reasoned that it would "frustrate the purpose of Congress" for the
PSC indirectly to assert jurisdiction over wholesale rates by
investigating their reasonableness as operating expenses in a
proceeding to establish reasonable retail rates. 4
3
ATTORNEYS
Bessette v. Enderlin School District No. 22
In Bessette v. Enderlin School District No. 2244 the court
considered the propriety of an attorney testifying on his client's
behalf. The trial court had refused to allow a personal injury
claimant's attorney to testify in rebuttal regarding a witness's
37. Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen, 314 N.W.2d 32, 38 (N.D. 1981). The PSC, in a
procceding to establish reasonable intrastate retail rates to consumers in North Dakota. had
specifically eliminated fromi NSP's cost of doing business, the costs incurred from abandonment of a
planned generating unit in another state. Id. at 33. FERC, however, acting Linder its authority to
establish reasonable interstate wholesale utility rates, allocated these losses as a part of NSP's
wholesale costs of obtaining interstate power. Id. at 34. The present action, therefore, involves a
dispute regarding whether the PSC "has jurisdiction to examine and determine the reasonableness
of all of NSP's retail expenses despite the fact that some retail expenses. were calculated on the
basis ofinterstate wholesale rates filed with FERC. " Id. at 35.
38. Id. at 38.
39. U.S. CONsT. art. VI. c. 2.
40. 314 N.W.2d at 37-38.
41. Id. at 37.
42. Id. at 37-38.
43. Id. at 38. The court, without discussing the issue, also rejected PSC's argument that federal
preemption of state power in this instance would violate the tenth amendment of the United States
Constitution by interiection of federal power into an area reserved to the state. Id. at 38.
44. 310 N.W.2d 759 (N.D. 1981).
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previous statement. 45 The court, citing disciplinary rule 5-102(A)
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 46 held that the trial
court's refusal was not an abuse of its discretion. 47 The supreme
court stated that in the event that a party's counsel decides that he
must testify, DR 5-102(A) requires that the attorney offer to
withdraw from the case or be prepared to show the existence of one
of the special circumstances enumerated in DR 5-101(B) (1)-(4).48
The court held that since counsel did not offer to withdraw in
Bessette, the trial court correctly denied counsel's request to testify.4 9
Dinger v. State Bar Board
In Dinger v. State Bar Board0 an unsuccessful bar applicant
challenged the essay portion of the North Dakota bar examination
on constitutional grounds, alleging that the tests were arbitrary and
capricious and that they were not valid tests of the applicant's legal
education and qualifications.51 Dinger asserted that the subjective
nature of the essay questions and their grading violated her right to
due process and equal protection under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section
twelve of the North Dakota Constitution.12 The court, noting that
essay tests are by their very nature subjective, held that in the
absence of evidence showing that her test was graded in an
arbitrary manner, the applicant failed to meet her burden of
establishing the tests' unrealiability.53
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Ristvedt v. Nettum
In Ristvedt v. Nettums 4 the supreme court faced the issue of a
45. Bessette v. Enderlin School Dist. No. 22, 310 N.W.2d 759, 764 (N.D. 1981).
46. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAl RESPONSIsLITV DR 5-102(A) (1981). Disciplinary rule 5-
102(A) provides:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer
learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness on
behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial and his firm, if any,
shall not continue representation in the trial. except that he may continue the
representation and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify in the circumstances
enumerated in DR 5-101(B) (1) through (4).
Id.
47. 310 N.W.2d at 764.
48. Id. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL. REsPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B) (1)-(4) (1981) (excep-
tions relate to testimony on collateral matters and where the attorney's testimony is indispensible to
the client's case).
49. 310 N.W.2d at 764.
50. 312 N.W.2d 15 1N.D. 981).
51. Dinger v. State Bar Bd.. 312 N.W.2d 15, 17 (N.D. 1981).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 17-18.
54. 311 NW.2d574(N.D. 1981).
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signing representative's personal obligation on a contract and an
instrument. 55 The court held that for a person's signature to bind
him or her personally to a contract, the parties must intend to bind
the signing party individually.5 6 Additionally, the court held that a
signing representative remains personally obligated on an
instrument unless the principal and agent are named in the
instrument and the instrument clearly shows the signature was
made on behalf of the principal. 57  When, however, "the
instrument names the person represented but does not show that
the representative signed in a representative capacity," parol
evidence will be permitted to establish that the agent signed in his
or her representative capacity.
5 1
On the contract for sale of Ristvedt's commodity brokerage
firm, Nettum signed in the following manner:
"/s/ Nettum Commodity Trading Inc.
Galen Nettum, Purchaser
/s/Galen Nettum. "9
The trial court held that by signing in this manner Nettum was
personally liable on the contract. 60 In reviewing the trial court's
decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that it "has
never before addressed the issue of whether or not a person who
signs a contract as Nettum signed in this case, is personally
liable. "61 The court, after reviewing a Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decision, 62 concluded that in order to bind a signing
representative, there must be an intent to bind the signing party
individually. 63 Because the contract was written in the first person
singular, did not mention Nettum Commodity Trading Inc. in the
body of the contract, and did not include the word "by" before
Nettum's signature, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that
55. Ristvedt v. Nettum, 311 N.W.2d 574, 576 (N.D. 1981).
56. Id. at 577.
57. Id. at 578.
58. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-03-40 (1968) (U.C.C. § 3-403)). Because the prom-
issory note involved in Ristvedt fulfilled the requirements of a negotiable instrument, it is
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. 311 N.W.2d at 578. See N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 41 (1968
& Supp. 1981) (Uniform Commercial Code).
59. Id. at 577.
60. Id. at 576.
61. Id.
62. Viso v. Werner, 471 Pa. 42, 369 A.2d 1185 (1977). Viso involved a proposal for a paving
job. Id. at -, 369 A.2d at 1186. The proposal was signed in the following manner: "Respectfully
submitted, Werner Contracting Co. By: s/Michael N. Werner." Id. at -, 369 A.2d at 1187. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that "the mere signature of[Werner] preceded by the word 'by'
and following the typed name of the corporation... is not conclusive that he was acting in a
representative capacity if the alleged contract showed an intent to bind appellant individually." Id,
at , 369 A.2d at 1188. It was necessary, therefore, to determine the intent of the parties. Id. at
__, 369 A.2d at 1187.
63. 311 N.W.2d at 577.
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Ristvedt and Nettum intended Nettum to be personally liable on
the contract.
64
The court also found Nettum personally liable on the prom-
issory note. 65 Personal liability will generally be imposed when an
"instrument names the person represented but does not show that
the representative signed in a representative capacity.... ",66 Parol
evidence is admissible to prove the representative capacity. 67 The
trial court's finding that the parties intended that Nettum be
personally liable on the promissory note was not clearly erroneous
and was, therefore, affirmed by the supreme court.
68
After Ristvedt the rule in North Dakota appears to be that to
avoid personal liability on a contract or promissory note, a signing
representative should clearly name his or her principal on the
contract or instrument, and should indicate that the signature has
been made on behalf of the principal. This can be done easily by
signing the contract or instrument in the following manner:
"XYZ Company, By John Doe, its President. "69
Additionally, the instrument or contract should name the
corporation in its main body and be written in first person plural.7"
The intent of the representative to enter into the contract as the
agent for the corporation should be made clear, and the corporation
should be made a party to contract negotiations. These facts taken
together should provide the necessary intent on the part of the
parties to bind the corporation and not the individual signing as a
representative. 7
Lumpkin v. Streifel
Lumpkin v. Streife 2 involved the issue of whether a homeowner
who signs a building permit application assumes a duty to
employees of an independent contractor.73 Lumpkin, an employee
of A & A Construction, an independent contractor, fell through an
opening and was severely injured while working on Streifel's
home.14 The Williams County district court dismissed Lumpkin's
64. Id. at 577-79.
65. Id. at 579.
66. Id. at 578 (quoting N.D. CF NT. CoDF, § 41-03-40 (1968)).
67. 311 N.W.2d at 578.
68. Id. at 579.
69. Id. at 578.
70. Id. at 577.
71. Id.
72. 308 N.W.2d 878 (N.D. 1981).
73. Lumpkin v. Streifel. 308 N.W.2d 878. 880 (N.D. 1981).
74. Id. at 878-79.
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action and he appealed. 7 5 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal. 
7 6
As a general rule, a homeowner is not liable for injury to the
employees of an independent contractor caused by the act or
negligence of the independent contractor, subcontractor, or
coemployee.77 The Lumpkins contended that their case fell within
one of the exceptions to the rule. They contended that Streifel had
violated a section of the Williston Building Code7 8 and that the
violation constituted evidence of negligence or negligence per se. 19
The court, however, distinguished the cases relied upon by the
Lumpkins8 0 and held that "[blecause Streifel .. .did not retain or
actually exercise any control or supervision over the project or
employees of A & A but was concerned primarily only with the
'finished' product" ' the owner should not be held liable for A &
A's negligence, if any.8' Additionally, the court held that the
signing of the application did not create any legal responsibility
between Streifel and Lumpkin under the circumstances of the
case.8 2 The court left unanswered the question of liability in the
event a member of the public was injured.
83
In his dissent Justice Pederson criticized the majority, stating
that the majority opinion "renders part of the [Williston building]
ordinance meaningless. "84 According to Justice Pederson, the
ordinance imposes a duty on the signer of a building permit
application, and the court should not question the wisdom of this
decision.8 5 Because the Williston ordinance did not specify the type
of responsibility assumed by the owner8 6 and contained no
language indicating any intent to alter the existing law with respect
75. Id. at 878.
76. Id. at 883. Justices Erickstad. Vande Walle and Paulson concurred in the majority opinion
written byJustice Sand. Id. Justice Pederson wrote a dissenting opinion. Id
77. id. at 880.
78. Id. at 879. See also BuItING OFFICIALS AND CODE ADMINISTRATORS INTERNATIONAL. INC.,
BASic Bit.otNc; Coo (6th ed. 1975). Section 1313.4 of the Basic Building Code provides the
following: "Guard Rails. All floor and wall openings shall be protected with substantial guard rails
and toebars in accordance with accepted engineering practice."- Id. § 1313.4.
79. 308 N.W.2d at 879.
80. Id. at 881-82. The cases relied upon by the Lunmpkins were: Giarratano v. Weitz Co., 259
Iowa 1292, 147 N.W.2d 824 (1967) and Leary v. Kelly Pipe Co.. 169 Mont. 511, 549 P.2d 813
(1976). The court distinguished Giarratano frot Lumpkin because in Giarratano a general contractor
and a subcontractor were involved and the general contractor had retained control of part of the
work. 308 N.W.2d at 881. Lumpkin, on the other hand, involved a property owner and an
independent contractor and the owner neither retained control nor exercised any control over the
work. Id. Leary was considered bs the court to be "readily distinguishable" because the laws and
regulations at issue in Leary imposed a specific responsibility on the permit holder, while the
ordinance and building cocle in question in Lumpkin was "couched in generalities." Id. at 882.
81. 308 N.W.2l at 883.
82. Id. at 881.
83. Id. at 882.
84. Id. at 883 (Pederson,.J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 882.
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to the duties and liabilities of property owners and independent
contractors,87 the majority of the court declined to hold the
property owners in Lumpkin liable for negligence when the owner
did not retain control of or exercise control over the work. 88 In the
future, if cities wish to impose this type of liability on signers of
building permits, the ordinances they enact should impose "a




In Kuhn v. Kuhn9" the North Dakota Supreme Court
considered whether the doctrine of res judicata precluded a third-
party beneficiary from seeking specific performance of a 1952
contract that was the subject of a prior action. 91 In the prior action
a family agreement which stated the manner in which parental
property was to be divided following the parents' deaths was held
enforceable as a valid contract. 92 Subsequent to this decision,
another family member brought suit seeking specific performance
of the contract as it related to him. 93
In a per curiam decision 94 the supreme court held that the
doctrine of res judicata applied and that the appellee was bound by
the prior decision, but only on those issues that were actually
litigated. 95 The court determined that only the first family
member's right to specific performance of the contract was litigated
in the first action. 96 Therefore, the court reasoned that other family
members, as third-party beneficiaries, were not precluded from
asserting their rights under the contract in a subsequent action. 97
The court also held that the appellee, who was named as a
defendant in the first action, was not bound by the district court's
decision that the contract was invalid, even though the appellee did
87. Id. at 882 n.5.
88. Id. at 882.
89. Id.
90. 301 N. W.2d 148 (N. D. 1981).
91. Kuhn v. Kuhn, 301 N.W.2(1 148. 150 (N.I). 1981).
92. See Kuhn v. Kuhn, 281 N.W.2d 230. 236 (N.D. 1979).
93. 301 NW.2d at 150.
94. Id. at 149. All live regular SUItICu' ciiurt justices deemed themselves disqualilied and did
tnt participate. Id. at 152.
95. Id. at 150.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 151.
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not appeal that judgment. 98 The court applied the exception99 to
the general rule'00 on the finality of judgments as to non-appealing
parties. 101
Medearis v. Miller
The doctrine of collateral estoppel was examined in Medearis v.
Miller. 102 A landowner recovered a judgment against the holders of
a contract for deed to his property. 103 The judgment was the result
of a trespass action involving an illegal easement for road
construction. 10 4 The landowner brought a second action alleging
that he was entitled to punitive damages against the road
developers. 10 5 The North Dakota Supreme Court applied the
general rule that a party is entitled to receive only one recovery for
a single harm caused by multiple parties. 10 6 The court found that
the appellant's failure to prove that the county had caused the
damage to his property in his first action was binding and not
subject to relitigation in the second action. ' 07 The court ruled that
since the road developer's liability was a derivative of the county's
liability, the appellant was not entitled to a second opportunity to
prove that the damage was caused by the county's construction of
the road. 10 8 However, the court found that even though the
appellant had a satisfaction of judgment for compensatory
damages, this did not preclude him from seeking punitive damages
against the road developers for the manner in which they caused
the road to be built. 1
09
Farmers Elevator Co. v. Nagel
The thirty day return requirement of rule 36 of the North
98. Id.
99. Id. The exception applies where the rights of all the parties are interwoven or where the
erroneous legal decision of the lower court forms the basis of all the parties' rights. When these
circumstances exist, the nonappealing party is entitled to the benefit of an appellate eourt
determination. Id.
100. Id. The general rule is that a nonappealing party is bound by the decision of the lower
court. Id.
101. Id. The court found that the district court's erroneous conclusion of law in the first action
involved the interwoven and dependent rights of all the parties. Therefore, justiee required that a
reversal ofsuch conclusing should apply to all the parties involved. Id. at 152.
102. 306 N.W.2d 200 (N.D. 1981).
103. Medearis v. Miller, 306 N.W.2d 200, 202 (N.D. 1981). The district court held that the
holders of the contract for deed were liable for the entire damage resulting from trespass. Id-
Apparently, no appeal was taken by the holders of the contract for deed.
104. Id.
105. Id- In the first action the appellant named the contract for deed holders, dh county, and the
township where his property was located as defindants. Id. at 201.
106. Id. at 202.
107. Id. at 203. In the second action the appellant sought damages against the road developers
on the theory that erosion damage was caused by the developer's construction of the road. Id
108. Id.
109. Id. at 204. Justice Pederson, dissenting in part, argued that the appellant was attempting to
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Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure'1 0 was at issue in Farmers Elevator
Co. v. Nagel."1  The appellant elevator company brought an
action against the appellee to recover money allegedly due on a
fertilizer shipment.1 1 2 Interrogatories and a request for admission
were served on the appellee, but his response was delayed beyond
the thirty day requirement of rule 36.113 The appellant argued in
district court that since the appellee failed to timely respond to the
request for admissions, the request for admissions should be
construed as constituting facts conclusively admitted by the
appellee.1 1 4 The district court rejected this theory and denied the
appellant's motion for summary judgment. 
1 1 5
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
district court had the authority to allow additional time for a
response to a request for admissions even though the time fixed by
rule 36 had expired.1 6 The test applied by the court when
considering granting additional time is whether allowing the late
response will aid in the determination of the merits of the action
without undue prejudice to the party making the request. 1 7 The
court held that, based on the circumstances of this case, 1 8 the
district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing additional
time for the appellee to respond to the request for admissions. 19
Saba v. County of Barnes
Certification of a class action under North Dakota's Uniform
Class Action Rule 20 was the issue in Saba v. County of Barnes. 12 1 By
an amended complaint1 22 the appellants, residents of the City of
Bismarck, brought an action against nine North Dakota counties
split his cause of action and, therefore, he would have affirmed the district court's dismissal. Id. at
204-05 (Pederson,.I., dissenting).
110. N.D.R. Civ. P. 36(a).
111. 307 N.W.2d 580 (N.D. 1981).
112. Farmers Elevator Co. v. Nagel, 307 N.W.2d 580, 582 (N.D. 1981).
113. Id. at 583. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 36(a) (the matter sought to be admitted is deemed admitted
unless a written answer or objection is returned within thirty days).
114. 307 N.W.2d at 583.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 586.
117. Id. See Marshall v. District of Columbia. 391 A.2d 1374 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978) (requesting
party has the burden of showing prejudice when a trial court extends permission to withdraw or
amend admissions).
118. 307 N.W.2d at 585. The court found that the delay was excusable since the request for
admissions was mailed to a wrong address. Further, since the appellee denied the matters in the
request, no prejudice could be demonstrated by the appellant. Id. at 585-86.
119. Id. at 586.
120. N.D.R. Cirv. P. 23.
121. 307 N.W.2d 590 (N.D. 1981).
122. Saba v. County of Barnes, 307 N.W.2d 590, 592 (N.D. 1981). The City of Bismarck was
initially named as a defendant, but was later dismissed from the action on a motion by the appellant.
Id.
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and one North Dakota corporation. 12 The complaint alleged that
the appellees negligently seeded the clouds over Bismarck, thereby
causing heavy rains. 11 4 These heavy rains produced flooding,
which resulted in damage to the appellant's property. 125 The
district court refused to certify the action as a class action because
other means of adjudicating the claims existed and because these
means were neither impractical nor inefficient. 1
26
On appeal the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's decision. 127 The court found that although there was
a common question of law and fact regarding the legal liability of
the appellees to the class, difficult and disparate individual
questions of damages suffered by the members of the class also
existed. 128 The court reasoned that even if the appellees were found
liable for negligently causing an increase in rainfall, the issue of
proximate cause and the amount of individual damages would have
to be determined on an individual basis. 129 Therefore, the court
found this case distinguishable from an earlier North Dakota class
action decision relied on by the appellants. 1
30
The supreme court agreed with the appellants' thesis
providing that one of the reasons for class action status is to permit
the sharing of legal expenses, especially in situations in which a
party's stake is of low monetary value.' 3' However, since both
appellants claimed damages in excess of $10,000, the court found
that the damages were not so inconsequential that economic reality
dictated either a class action suit or no suit at all. 132 Therefore,
since a class action suit did not offer the most appropriate means of
adjudicating the claims and defenses in this case, the court ruled
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
certify the suit as a class action. 13
Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall, and Fiedler, Ltd.
Whether a partial summary .judgment can be appealed was
123. Id. The corporation named as defendant was Weather Modification, Inc. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 593. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 23(a)(l ) (trial court may certify a class action ifit finds that
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical).
127. 307 N.W.2d at 592.
128. Id. at 594. The complaint sought to include the entire population of Bismarck as members
of the class. Id. at 592.
129. Id. at 594.
130. Id. See Rogelstad v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 226 N.W.2d 370 (N.D. 1975)
(class members' individual damages are ascertainable by an examination of existing records).
131. 307 N.W.2d at 596.
132. Id. Appellant Saba alleged damages in the amount of $35,140.00. Id.
133. Id. at 597. The court specifically noted that the class action rule was not intended to be used
as a device for soliciting additional plaintiffs willing to share the litigation costs ofexploring a "novel
theory of liability." Id. at 596.
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considered in Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall, and Fiedler, Ltd. 134 In a
malpractice action, the district court granted a rule 56135 summary
judgment motion against a law firm on the issue of liability for legal
malpractice. 136 The appellee contended that since a partial
summary judgment is interlocutory in nature, the summary
judgment is not appealable until the issue of damages is resolved. 1
3 7
The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed. 138 The court found
that the right to an appeal is statutory in North Dakota. 139 Further,
the court noted that section 28-27-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code 140 states which court orders are appealable and reviewable by
the supreme court.1 4 1 The court held that even though the
summary judgment on the liability issue was not a final
determination, the order substantively denied the appellant law
firm the opportunity to present a defense.' 4 2  This denial
substantially affected the appellant's rights and, therefore, under
section 28-27-02 of the North Dakota Century Code interlocutory
summary judgment was appealable. 
143
COMMERCIAL LAW
Robertson Companies v. Kenner
In Robertson Companies v. Kenner144 Robertson entered into a
contract with Kenner to build grain storage bins to be completed in
October. 145 When the bins were not completed in October, Kenner
was forced temporarily to store his sunflower crop and sell the crop
during the depressed winter market. 146 Kenner did not pay for the
bins when they were completed the next year in a defective state,
and Robertson sued to collect the balance due on the contract. 147
Robertson appealed the trial court's decision to award damages to
Kenner for rescisson of the contract caused by Robertson's
134. 311 N. W.2d 1I75(N.1). 1981)
135. N. D.R. Cik. P. 56.
136. Sheet s v. letnes. Marshall. & Fiedler., ltd.. 311 N. W .2d 17.5, 177 (NDI). 1981)
137. Id. at 178.
138. Id. at 179.
139. Id. at 178.
140. N.D. CENT. COD. §F28-27-02 (1974).
141. 311 N.W.2d at 178. Section 28-27-02(5) of the North Dakota Century Code provides that
"an order which involves the merits of an action" may be carried to the supreme court when such an
order was made bv a court. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-27-02(5) (1974).
142. 311 N.W .2dlat 179.
143. Id.
144. 311 N. W. 2d 194 (N.D. 1981)
145. Robertson Companies v. Kenner, 311 N.W.2d 194, 196 (N.D. 1981).
146. Id. at 197.
147. Id.
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insubstantial performance. 14 8 The supreme court held that all the
trial court's findings were supported by sufficient evidence and
affirmed its decision. 14 9 In reaching this result, the court found that
Kenner had complied with the statutes governing rescission
because he had promptly informed Robertson that the storage bins
were defective and that he would not accept the buildings in that
condition and because he had offered to return everything of value
he received in the contract. 
1 50
Robertson's main contention was that the trial court should
not have awarded Kenner consequential damages for lost profits on
the sunflower crop because rescission and damages are mutually
exclusive remedies. 5t The court noted that rescission and damages
are not exclusive remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.).1 52 The question then became whether the transaction
was a sale of goods under the U.C.C. or a rendition of services for
repairing the bins not governed by the U.C.C. 1 53 The court stated:
In contracts involving both a sale of goods and a rendition
of services, if the predominant factor, the thrust, the
148. Id. Robertson claimed that he was entitled to compensation for dismantling the early
partial construction, the balance due on the contract, and additional erection costs he incurred. Id.
149. Id. at 194.
150. Id. at 198. The defective condition was white rust which had formed on the galvanized steel
panels clue to Robertson's improper storage of the panels over the winter months. The court found
that because white rust on the panels destroyed the maintenance-free characteristic of the bin which
Kenner had contracted for, Robertson had not substantially performed the contract. Id.
The statutory requirements for rescission are found in sections 9-09-02 and 9-09-04 of the North
Dakota Century Codc. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-09-02. -04 (1975). Section 9-09-04 provides as follows:
Rescission . . . can be accomplished only by the use, on the part of the party
rescinding, of reasonable diligence to comply with the following rules:
I. He must rescind promptly upon discovering the facts which entitle him to
rescind, ifhe is free from duress, menace, undue influence, or disability and
is aware of his right to rescind: and
2. He must restore to the other party evcrything of value which he has
received from him under the contract or must offer to restore the same upon
condition that such party shall do likewise, unless the latter is unable or
positively refuses to do so.
Id. § 9-09-04.
151. 311 N.W.2d at 199.
152. Id. (citing Welken v. Conley, 252 N.W.2d 311 (N.D. 1977) and N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-
99 (1968)). Section 41-02-99 of the North Dakota Century Code states that "luInless the contrary
intention clearly appears, expressions of 'cancellation' or 'rescission' of the contract or the like shal
not be construed as a renunciation or discharge of any claim in damages for an antecedent breach."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-99 (1968).
153. 311 N.W.2d at 199. Section 41-02-02 of the North Dakota Century Code states what typt
oftransactions the U.C.C. applies to:
Unless the context otherwise requires, this chapter applies to transactions in
goods: it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an
unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a security
transaction nor does this chapter impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to
consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers.
N.D. CENT. CODE §41-02-02(1968)(U.C.C §2-102).
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purpose reasonably stated is the sale of the goods with the
rendition of services incidentally involved, the contract is
for a sale of goods and the Uniform Commercial Code is
applicable .... 154
In this case, the court found that the sale of the bins was the main
purpose of the contract, and the services rendered to repair and
build the bins were incidental. 55 The court also stated that the term
"goods" should be construed broadly in order to "achieve
uniformity in commercial transactions.' 51 6 In finding that the
grain storage bins were "goods" as defined by the U.C.C., the
court noted that several other similar structures had also been
found to be "goods.' ' 57 The court affirmed the trial court's
decision to award Kenner consequential damages (lost profits) plus
interest because of Robertson's insubstantial performance on the
contract for the sale of the grain storage bins. 158
Leininger v. Sola
In Leininger v. Sola 159 the supreme court reviewed the trial
court's conclusion that Sola had breached an express warranty to
Leininger resulting in an award of $29,233 in consequential
damages. 160 Sola's motion for a new trial was denied, and he
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.' 16 Sola's appeal of
154. 311 N.W.2d at 199 (citing Air Heaters, Inc. v.Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649 (N.D.
1977)).
155. 311 N.W.2diat 199.
156. Id. at 200 (citing Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532
F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1976) and Duffee v.judson, 251 Pa. Super. 406, 380 A.2d 843 (1977)).
Section 41-02-05(1) of the North Dakota Century Code provides the following definition of
"goods":
"Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in
which the' price is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 41-08) and things in
action. "Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and
other identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be
severed from realty (section 41-02-07).
N.D. CENT. CODE S 41-02-05(l) (1968) (U.C.C. S 2-105).
157. 311 N.W.2d at 200. The court considered that other jurisdictions found similar structures
were goods and stated the following:
Included within the definition of goods are "hog houses," Thompson Farms, Inc. v.
Corno Feed Products, Div. of Nat. Octs. Co., 173 Ind. App. 682, 366 N.E.2d 3
(1977); "calf-confinement buildings," Shinrone, Inc. v. Tasco, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 280
(Iowa 1979); a one-million gallon water tank, Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v.
Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1976); sewage processing
plant, Omaha Pollution Control Corp. v. Carver-Greenfield, 413 F. Supp. 1069
(D. Neb. 1976); and mobile hortes, Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d
635 (1976).
311 N.W.2d at 200.
158. 311 N.W.2dat 194.
159. 314 N.W.2d 39 (N.D. 1981).
160. leininger v. Sola, 314 N.W.2d 39, 40 (N.D. 1981).
161. Id.
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the motion for a new trial was based on three specifications of error:
1) There was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's
finding that Sola had given Leininger an express warranty; 2) the
evidence was insufficient to show that there was no limitation of
remedy; and 3) the evidence was insufficient to show that
consequential damages were the proper remedy for breach of a
contract or warranty by Sola. 1
62
Leininger, a buyer of dairy cows, brought an action against
Sola for breach of warranty. Leininger claimed that Sola had
warranted that the twenty-three cows sold were pregnant and
would soon be calving, as required for Leininger's milking
operations. 1 3 Leininger learned after the sale that nine of the
twenty-three cows were bred, but would not be calving for several
months and that ten more of the twenty-three cows were not even
pregnant. 164 In the months following this discovery, Leininger and
Sola were unable to negotiate a settlement. Therefore, Leininger
bought a bull to impregnate the cows to reduce his financial losses
and brought this action for breach of warranty. 1
65
The supreme court initially found that the evidence supported
a finding that Sola had given Leininger an express warranty that
the cows were pregnant. 166 In reaching this decision the court noted
that Leininger was looking for bred cows, that Sola had testified
that he knew unbred cows would be useless to Leininger, and that
the natural conclusion was that Leininger would not have
purchased the cows unless there was an express warranty of
pregnancy. 167 The court also relied on the language of section 41-
02-30 of the North Dakota Century Code, which defines the
creation of express warranties. 168 As to Sola's contention that
Leininger's remedies were limited to contractual damages without
consequential damages, the court found that the trial court was
correct in determining that there was no limitation of remedies.
The court noted that Leininger did not expressly limit his remedies
as required under section 41-02-98(1)(b) of the North Dakota
Century Code. 1
69
162. Id. at 42-43.
163. Id. at 40-41.
164. Id. at 41.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 43-44. The court also noted that the existence of warranties of pregnancy of animals
is a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 44 (citing McCurdy v. Aylor, 41 N.D. 187, 170 N.W. 523
(1918) and Annot, 67 A.L.R.2d 619, 646-47 (1959)).
168. 314 N.W.2d at 44: N.D. CENT. ConE § 41-02-30 (1968) (U.C.C. § 2-313).
169. 314 N.W.2d at 44. Section 41-02-98(1) of the North Dakota Century Code discusses conse-
quential damages and provides in relevant part:
a. the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for
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The final issue the court addressed was whether the award of
consequential damages was proper for a breach of warranty. 17 0 The
court found that consequential damages are recoverable when
accepted goods are later discovered to be nonconforming,171 but
that the damages are limited to those reasonably foreseeable as a
consequence of the breach of contract. 17 2 Since Sola knew that non-
bred cows would not be milk producing for Leininger, the
consequential damages of loss of milk produced was reasonably
foreseeable to Sola.17 3 Furthermore, the court found that the
method of calculating the lost profits based on lost production and
daily production rates was reasonable given the circumstances of
the case. 7 4 Sola also contended that Leininger could not recover
consequential damages because he could have avoided by "cover"
as specified in subsection 2 of section 41-02-94 of the North Dakota
Century Code. 7 ' The court found that Leininger had acted
reasonably to mitigate his damages as evidenced by his numerous
attempts to talk with Sola, his initiation of pregnancy testing, and
his purchasing a bull. 76 Sola's final contention was that the
consequential damages awarded were incorrectly based on gross
profits and not net profits because the trial court did not consider
the cost of wintering bred cows as compared to nonbred cows.
1 77
The court found that there was sufficient evidence in the record to
indicate that the cost of wintering nonproducing cows is
significantly less than the cost of wintering producing cows.' 78
Since Leininger actually had wintered nineteen nonproducing cows
and had been awarded consequential damages that included the
cost of wintering producing cows, the amount of damages awarded
was improper. 79 Therefore, the court stated that unless Leininger
those provided in this chapter and may limit or alter the measure of
damages recoverable under this chapter, as bylimiting the buyer's remedies
to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and
replacement of nonconforming goods or parts; and
b. resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly
agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-98(l) (1968) (U.C.C. S 2-719).
170. 314 N.W.2d at 45.
171. Id.
172. 314 N.W.2d at 45 (citing Schneidt v. Absey Motors. Inc., 248 N.W.2d 792, 799 (N.D.
1976)).
173. 314 N.V.2d at 45.
174. Id. at 46-47. The court relied on several cases from other jurisdictions in which lost profits
were awarded where the calculations were of reasonable certainty. See W. & W. Livestock
Enterprises, Inc. v. Dennler, 179 N.W.2d 484, 489 (Iowa 1970); Dold v. Sherow, 220 Kan. 350, 552
P.2d 945 (1976); Bemidji Sales Barn, Inc. v. Chatfield, 312 Minn. 11,250 N.W.2d 185 (1977).
175. 314 N.W.2dat 47; N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-94(2)(a)(1968) (U.C.C. § 2-715(2)).
176. 314 N.W.2dat 48.
177. Id. at 49.
178. Id. This evidence was based on Leininger's testimony at the trial. Id.
179. Id. at 50,
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consented to a remittitur for the amount of the excess consequential
damages awarded (the difference in cost between wintering
producing and nonproducing cows), the court would grant a new
trial on the issue of consequential damages. 18 0
State Bank of Towner v. Hansen
In State Bank of Towner v. Hansen 8' debtor, Hansen, had
executed security agreements and mortgages placing his livestock,
farm machinery, and certain real property as collateral.18 2 After
Hansen defaulted, the Bank repossessed the pledged personal
property and sold the collateral at various farm machinery and
livestock auction sales and applied the sales proceeds against the
debt. 8 3 Subsequently, the Bank obtained a deficiency judginent
and foreclosed on the mortgaged real property. 18 4 Hansen appealed
the judgment and foreclosure, alleging that the Bank failed to give
notice of the sale of the repossessed collateral and that it failed to
dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.
Hansen also claimed that the Bank should not be allowed to
foreclose on the real property after proceeding against personal
property and that it should be absolutely barred from receiving any
deficiency judgment. 8 5 The Bank raised as its defense the
exception to the notice requirement found within section 41-09-
50(3) of the North Dakota Century Code. 18 6 The exception used by
the Bank involves collateral that is perishable and is sold on a
recognized market. 
8 7
The court, in finding for Hansen, determined that notice was
required and that the livestock and farm machinery were not sold
on recognized markets, nor were they perishable so as to allow
abandonment of the notice requirement. 88 The court cited State Bar
of Burleigh County v. All-American Sub, Inc. 189 and approved the use
of a presumption that the collateral was equal to the outstanding
debt. ' 90 Prior to receiving a deficiency judgment, the creditor must
overcome this presumption by producing evidence showing that the
fair market value of collateral is less than the outstanding debt. 19'
180. Id.
181. 302 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1981).
182. State Bank ofTowner v. Hansen, 302 N.W.2d 760, 763 (N.D. 1981).
183. Id. at 763-64.
184. Id. at 763.
185. Id. at 768.
186. Id. at 765. Seealso N.D. CENT. CODE j 41-09-50(3) (Supp. 1981) (U.C.C. S9-504(3)).
187. 302 NW.2d at 765.
188. Id. at 764-66.
189. 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980).
190. 302 N.W.2d at 767.
191. Id.
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Therefore, failure to furnish notice is not an absolute bar to a
deficiency judgment. 1
92
The court construed section 41-09-47(4) of the North Dakota
Century Code 93 and determined that the Bank, whose security
consisted of both personal and real property, had the option of
proceeding in a single default action or in separate actions for each
kind of property. 194 The court further found that if a single action
for both types of collateral was commenced, the rights and remedies
of real property law control the action. 195 However, under separate
actions, the personal property action would be subject to the
Uniform Commercial Code, and the independent real property
action must follow real property law. '
96
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
City of Minot v. Central Avenue News, Inc.
In City of Minot v. Central Avenue News, Inc.19  the court
reviewed two ordinances enacted by the City to ameliorate
problems it believed would accompany adult entertainment
centers. 9 8 The first, a license ordinance, imposed higher license
fees on motion picture booths used to view sexually explicit films
than on other types of mechanical devices. 199 The second, a zoning
192. Id. at 766.
193. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-47(4) (Supp. 1981) (U.C.C. § 9-501(4)).
194. 302 N.W.2d at 764.
195. Id.
196. 302 N.W.2d at 764.
197. 308 N."W.2d 851 (N.D. 1981), appeal dismissed, 50 U.S.I.W. 3486 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981)
(No. 81-734) (want ofa substantial federal question).
198. City ofMinot V. Central Ave. News, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1981), appeal dismissed,
50 U.S.,.W. 3486 (U.S. Dec. 15. 1981) (No. 81-734) (want of a substantial federal question)- The
Minot (:ity Council believed that an adult entertainment center would bring about increased law
enforcement problems and have a negative impact on neighboring areas. Id. at 855.
199. Id. The Minot licensing ordinance states in relevant part:
The purpose of this ordinance is to recognize and to provide for the fact that the
operation of mechanical amusement devices which depict or display specified sexual
activities or specified anatomical areas results in increased enforcement problems for
the city and additional expense to the city that justifies a higher license fee for these
devices than for other mechanical amusement devices. This follows because it is not
immediatiI, possiblh to distinguish between constitutionally protected non-obscine
(ipictions or portrayals of explicit sexual conduct, on one hand, fron non-
constitotionally' protected obscene portrayals of sexual conduct on ihe other hand.
IThis necessitates greater police vigilance to assure that thi lawful business of
displainu non-obscene portrayals or depictions of sexual conduct is not used
inadvertently or by design as the means of unlawfully displaying or depicting
obscenity. In order to recoup some of the costs thus imposed on the city it is
appropriae that there he imposed on the persons who profit from such devices some of
ihe costs of insuring that the devices are used only lawfully.
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ordinance, restricted the permissible locations of adult
entertainment centers. 20 The City sought to restrain the defendant
corporation from operating an entertainment center until it
complied with the ordinances.
20
1
The defendant argued that the higher fees imposed by the
license ordinance were confiscatory in nature, in violation of the
first amendment to the federal constitution. 20 2 Additionally, the
defendant contended that the distance requirements imposed by the
zoning ordinance unconstitutionally suppressed or greatly
restricted access to lawful speech. 203 The defendant also argued that
certain disclosure provisions of the zoning ordinance violated its
right of association guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments.
204
To determine whether the licensing fees were constitutional,
the court applied the test articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Murdock v. Pennsylvania.205 As stated in Murdock, only
nominal license fees imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the
expenses of policing business practices that revolve around the
exercise of first amendment rights will withstand constitutional
The license thee for a mechanical amusement dev ice, other than a device used on a
regular basis to depict or display specified anatonmical areas or specified sexual
activities, shall be $25.00 a year fur each device, provided that the owner of 10 or more
such devices subject to licensing need pay only $250.00 a year for annual licenses for
all of his machines .... The license for a mechanical amusement device used on a
regular basis to depict or display specified anatomical areas or specified sexual
activities shall be $300.00 a machine per year, irrespecti c of the number of machines
owned by any one person.
MixO CIr OROiNANCE No. 2337 (1979).
200. 308 N.W.2d at 855. Number 2336 ol the Minot zoning ordinance provided in pertinent
part is lollows:
Notwithstanding anything in this zoning ordinance to the contrary, an adult
entertainment center shall be permitted only in the M-2 District and in no other
district, and then only if the center meets the following conditions:
(I) The center is located no closer than 1,250 leet from any pre-existing church.
school, or property zoned RI. R2. R3, or R4.
(2) The center excludes from its premises those persons less than 18 years of age.
(3) The center displays no signs visible froim the exterior of the center, except for signs
identifying the center as an adult book store or adult cinema or both.
(4) No materials depicted [sicl specified sexual activities or specilied anatimical areas
shall be visible from the exterior of the center.
(5) The manager and the owners of the center arc registered with the Chief' ol Police
and have provided him with such information as he reasonably may require with
respect to their identities, including finger prints, and prior criminal records, if'any.
(6) The business premises of the center which are generally open to its patrons are
open equally at the same time without charge to members of the city police force who
may wish to enter thereon provided the entry is in the course of the discharge of the
policeman's duties.
MINOT CITY ORDINANCE No. 2336 (1979).
201. 308 N.W.2d at 857.
202. Id. at 859.
203. Id. at 863.
204. Id. at 862.
205. 319 U.S. 105 (1936).
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attack.2 °6 The North Dakota court determined that license fees may
be designed to defray the cost of issuing the license, as well as the
reasonable cost of policing the activity being licensed.20 In City qf
Minot the license fee of $300 did not, in the court's view, exceed
what the City could reasonably expect to expend while overseeing
the operation of the amusement devices.208 The licensing ordinance
was not confiscatory in nature, and thus, was constitutional.
20 9
The court also found that the distance requirement imposed
by the zoning ordinance was constitutional. The ordinance did not
attempt to restrict all forms of adult bookstores. Rather, a
substantial area within the city remained available for adult
entertainment centers. 21 0 Thus, the ordinance neither suppressed
nor greatly restricted access to lawful speech. 21 1 The zoning
ordinance also required owners and managers of adult bookstores
to furnish the chief of police "such information as he reasonably
may require with respect to their identities, including finger prints,
and prior criminal records, if any." ' 21 2 For such a disclosure
requirement to withstand a constitutional challenge, a substantial
relationship must exist between the information sought to be
disclosed and the significant government interest to be served by
the disclosure.21 3 Moreover, the least drastic means to achieve the
governmental purpose must be employed. 21 4 The North Dakota
Supreme Court found that the requirement of disclosing prior
criminal records "goes too far." 21 5 The court suggested that a more
narrowly drawn criminal record disclosure requirement, which
focused on particular crimes related to the governmental interest,
"might survive constitutional scrutiny." ' 21 6 The Minot provision,
however, was unconstitutionally overbroad.
2 1 7
Olson v. City qf West Fargo
In Olson v. City of West Fargo2 1 the court reviewed a cabaret
ordinance that prohibited live performances that contained any
form of dancing. 21 9 The plaintiffs argued that the cabaret ordinance
206. 308 N \'V.2d at 859 (citing Murdock \. Pcnnsylvania. 319 U.S. 105, 114 (1936)).
207. Id. at 860.
208. Id. at 861.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 865.
211.Id. at 864.
212. Id. at 863.
213. Id. at 862 (citing Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1.64 (1976)).




218. 305 N.W.2d821 (N.1). 1981).
219. ()lson v. City of' West Fargo. 305 N.W.2d 821, 822 (N.). 1981). The West Fargo
Or dinance provideId in pertinent part that:
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was facially overbroad and vague in violation of the first
amendment of the federal constitution. 
220
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that a state may
regulate the use and sale of alcoholic beverages pursuant to its
police power and the twenty-first amendment. The state's
authority does not reach beyond the "barroom doors", however. 221
In the case at hand, the ordinance was confined to the four walls of
the barroom and focused only on individuals dancing for
consideration. 222 Because the ordinance was narrowly drawn, the
court found no unconstitutional encroachment on speech and
expression. 223 Thus, the ordinance was not overbroad. 2
2 4
The defendant also argued that the portion of the ordinance
that excepted "incidental movement" from dancing was
unconstitutionally vague and had a chilling affect on first
amendment rights. 225 He asserted that it would be impossible for an
entertainer to know when movements "cease to be incidental and
begin to be 'dancing' as it is normally known." ' 226 The court held
that the area between "incidental movements" and "dancing"
was not so vague as to "place a reasonable person in a position of
utter uncertainty as to whether he or she is on the threshold of
violating a prohibition on dancing. "227 Thus, the cabaret
ordinance was constitutional. 
228
No live performances are permitted on a licensed premise which contain any form
of dancing. Such prohibition on dancing does not include the incidental movement or
choreography of singers or musicians which are made in connection with their singing
or playing of a musical instrument. This restriction applies to all licensed premises
whether or not they have a cabaret license.
No live performances are permitted on a licensed premise which involve the
removal of clothing, garments or any other costume. Such prohibition does not
include the removal of headwear or footwear: or the incidental removal of a tie,
suitcnat, sportcoat, jacket, sweater or similar outer garments. Incidental removal for
purposes of this section shall mean the removal of a gamnent or arti c of clothing
which is not a part of the act or performance. This restriction applies to all licensed
premises whether or not they have a cabaret license.
A licensee shall have the duty and responsibility to make available for inspection
by a member of the West Fargo Police Department an identilication card. such as a
driver's license, containing a photograph and the age ofall entertainers or performers
on the licensed premises. The licensee shall not permit a person to make a live
performance on the licensed premise if the licensee is not able to obtain the required
identification from the performer.
WEST FARGO ORDtNANC No. 13-0130.01(d) (1980).
220. 305 N.W.2d at 824.
221. Id. at 826.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 827.
224. Id
225. Id at 828.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. it 829.
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Rothe v. S-N-Go Stores, Inc.
In Rothe v. S-N-Go Stores, Inc. 29 the court upheld the
constitutionality of the statutory requirement mandating that
managers of small grocery stores have an ownership interest in the
business before a store may remain open on Sunday. 23 0 The
defendant asserted that section 12.1-30-03(28) of the North Dakota
Century Code violated the equal protection clause. 23 1 The statute,
argued the defendant, treated two small grocery stores differently
on the "sole distinction that one store [was] operated by a manager
who [was] also an owner of the business whereas the other store
[was] operated by a manager who [was] a hired employee with no
ownership interest." 23 2 The defendant also contended that such a
classification was discriminatory and did not further any legitimate
government objective.
233
To determine whether the statute violated the equal protection
clause, the court adopted the standard articulated in McGowan v.
State of Maryland.234 The equal protection clause is offended only if
the classification created is wholly irrelevant to achieving the
State's objective. 235 Thus, the classification must be rationally
related to a legitimate government interest. 236 The State asserted
that promoting Sunday as a day of rest and relaxation was a
legitimate government interest. 237 The court agreed and found that
discouraging the proliferation of small grocery stores remaining
open on Sunday by requiring that the manager have an ownership
interest in the store was rationally related to providing a day of rest
and relaxation. 238  Thus, the statute withstood constitutional
attack.239
Snortland v. Crawford
In Snortland v. Crawford240 the North Dakota Supreme Court
229. 308 N.W.2d 872 (N.D. 1981). S-N-Go is a North Dakota corporation which operates nine
Stop-N-Go grocery stores in Cass County. Rothe v. S-N-Go Stores, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 872, 873
(N.D. 1981).
230. Id. at 875. Section 12.1-30-03 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in pertinent
part: "The operation of any of the following businesses shall be allowed on Sundays: Grocery stores
operated by the owner-manager who regularly employs not more than three employees for the
operation of said store." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-30-03(28) (Supp. 1979).
231. 308 N.W.2d at 875.
232. Id. at 876.
233. Id. at 874.
234. Id. at 876. See McGowan v. State of Maryland. 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Maryland's Sunday
closing laws upheld).
235. 308 N.W.2d at 876 (quoting McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)).
236. 308 N.W.2d at 876.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 877.
239. Id.
240. 306 N.W.2d 614 (N.D. 1981),
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declared section 16-20-04 of the North Dakota Century Code241
unconstitutional as violative of the first and fourteenth
amendments to the federal constitution.2 4 2  Section 16-20-04
limited the amount a candidate could spend on his political
campaign to five hundred dollars or fifteen percent of the annual
salary of the office for which the candidate was running. 243 The
defendant argued that section 16-20-14 was unconstitutional after
the United States Supreme Court decision of Buckley v. Valeo.
244
The Court in Buckley held that limitations on individual campaign
expenditures were an unconstitutional burden on first amendment
rights. 
2 4 5
Courts consistently have recognized that political expression is
a preferred right protected by the first amendment because freedom
of speech is essential to the electoral process. 246 The North Dakota
Supreme Court noted that legislation affecting fundamental rights
must be subjected to the "closest scrutiny." This scrutiny requires
a demonstration that the law is necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest and that there is no less burdensome method
of accomplishing the intended purpose. 247 The court found that
although the state interests of preventing corruption or its
appearance and equalizing the ability of candidates to participate
in the political arena were "worthy" objectives, they were
insufficient to justify the statute's infringement on first amendment




In State v. Knitte250 the court construed section 39-06.1-10(5) of
241. N.D. CNT. CODE § 16-20-04 (1971). Section 16-20-04 of the North Dakota Century Code
provided in pertinent part that:
No sum of money shall be paid and no expenses shall be authorized or incurred
by any candidate seeking nomination to any public office or position in this state in a
primary election campaign or any candidate who has received the nomination to any
public office or position and is a candidate in the general election or any candidate in a
special election in excess of five hundred dollars or fifteen percent of the annual salary
of the office for which he is running, whichever is greater.
Id.
242. Snortland v. Crawford, 306 N.W.2d 614, 627 (N.D. 1981). In this action, the unsuccessful
candidate for Superintendent of Public Instruction, Howard Snortland, argued that Joseph
Crawford was guilty of a corrupt practice and should be deprived of his office because his campaign
expenditures exceeded the limitations provided in section 16-20-04 of the North Dakota Century
Code. Id. at 625.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 626. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
245. 424 U.S. at 58-59.
246. 306 N.W.2d at 626.
247. Id. at 627.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. 308 N.W.2d 379 (N.D. 1981).
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the North Dakota Century Code, 251 the driver's license suspension
statute, to require more than constructive notice of an opportunity
for a hearing prior to revocation of a driver's license. 252 The
defendant pleaded guilty to driving while under the influence of
alcohol. 253 The State Highway Department then sent a notice of
"Opportunity for Hearing" on the suspension of defendant's
license to his home address.2 54 The Highway Department issued an
order suspending defendant's license after he failed to respond to
the notice. 25 5 The defendant was later stopped for a traffic violation
and cited for driving with a suspended license. 256 The State
introduced the notice of hearing and order of suspension at the
defendant's trial.
257
The defendant moved to dismiss at the close of the State's case
on the ground that the State did not prove that defendant received
the notice of "Opportunity for Hearing" or of suspension of his
driver's license. 258 The State argued that the affidavits of mailing
were sufficient proof that defendant received notice. 259 The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss after defendant testified, and
the State appealed.
260
The supreme court noted that due process requires notice and
an opportunity for a hearing before a state may suspend a driver's
license, unless an emergency situation exists. 261 Thus, mere
constructive delivery of the notice of opportunity for a hearing did
not meet the standard of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution. 262 Although actual notice of
suspension was not required, the court held that notice of an
opportunity for a hearing sent by regular mail was insufficient to
251. N.D. CENT. CoDE , 39-06.1-10(5) (1972). Section 39-06.1 -10(5) of the North )akota
Centurv Code provides in pertinent part that: "A suspension shall be deemed to have commenced
when the order of suspension is delivered to the licensee at his address of record in the department.
Constructive delivery under this section shall be considered as accurring forty-eight hours after
proper deposit in the mails." Id.
252. State v. Knittel. 308 N.W.2d 379. 383 (N.1. 1981)





258. Id at 380-81.
259. Id. at 381.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 384. Ser Bell v. Burson. 402 U.S. 535 (1975).
262. 308 N.W.2d at 384.
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In State v. Howe264 the defendant moved for expunction of his
arrest records because he was not convicted on the charges for
which he was arrested. No statutory authorization exists for
expunction of arrest records so the defendant rested his claim on
due process and a court's inherent power to protect his rights of
privacy. 265 The court in Howe rejected the defendant's privacy
claim, stating that the United States Supreme Court has recognzed
privacy claims in matters relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and education. 266 With regard
to the due process claim, the court stated that courts have the
authority, as well as an obligation, to expunge arrest records if one
is arrested in violation of his constitutional rights or is arrested
based upon a criminal statute that is later determined to be
unconstitutional. 267 Accordingly, the case was remanded to
determine whether the defendant was entitled to expunction of his
arrest records under these standards.
It is noteworthy that in Howe the majority held that the instant
action was civil in nature and that the defendant had failed to
properly effect service of process on the parties. 268 The court held,
however, that the parties submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction
by their appearance. 269 Justice Sand dissented on this point,
arguing that the trial court and the supreme court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case. 270 The dissenting opinion relied on the
reasoning that a proper civil appeal was not before the court
because the facts did not establish that all the parties appeared
before the trial court and that a proper criminal appeal was not
before the court because such an action was time-barred under the
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. 271 Therefore, Justice
Sand argued that the lower court's denial of the defendant's motion
263. d.
264. 308 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1981).
265. Su . Howc. 308 N.W.2d 743. 746-47 (N.i). 1981)
266. Id. at 748 (citing Paul v. Davis. 424 U.S. 693 (1976)). The court in Iowt,' noted, howevr.
that expunction has been granted based on claims olprivacy. 308 N.W.2d at 747. Seee.g., Davidson
Dill, 180 CoIo. 123. 503 P.2(1 157 (1972).
267. 308 N. W. 2d a 748.
268. M, at 745.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 750 (Sand,.J.. dissenting).
271. d. at 750-52. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 33(d).
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should have been affirmed without prejudice and that the
defendant should undertake the proper civil action against the
custodians of the arrest records .
2 72
CONTRACTS
Western Tire, Inc. v. Skrede
In Western Tire, Inc. v. Skrede273 the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that an acceptance of an irrevocable offer must
unequivocally conform, in both time and manner, to the method of
acceptance specified in the offer. This case arose out of a
controversy surrounding the exercise of a lease extension option.
274
The lease agreement specified that if the option to extend the lease
was to be exercised, written notice had to be given thirty days prior
to the expiration of the original lease term. 275 The lease also
specified that the written notice must be sent to Skrede, the lessor,
either by registered or certified mail.2 76 Western Tire, the lessee,
sent notice of intention to extend the lease period by ordinary mail
prior to the deadline for giving notice. 277 Upon discovery that the
notice was incorrectly mailed, Western Tire sent a second notice by
certified mail. However, this notice was mailed five days after the
deadline for giving notice.2 78 Subsequently, Skrede informed
Western Tire that the lease would terminate under the original
term because of Western Tire's failure to properly send the
notice. 279 Western Tire brought suit claiming that the notice
through the ordinary course of the mails effectively exercised the
option to extend its lease. 280 The trial court found that Western
Tire was entitled to equitable relief because the failure to send
notice by registered or certified mail was merely a technical breach
of the contract.
281
The supreme court reversed the trial court. 28 2 Although the
court recognized authority holding that the manner of acceptance
272. Id. at 752.
273. 307 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1981)
274. Western Tire. Inc. v. Skrede, 307 N.W.2d 558, 563 (N.). 1981). Under the rtiis of the
lease We'stern Tire had thet option to renew the lease for an additional period of five years. d. ;it 560.
275. Id.
276. Id.





282. Id at 564
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specified in the offer is only a suggested form of acceptance,283 the
court concluded that the terms of the lease clearly provided for an
exclusive means of acceptance. 284 The court reasoned that because
an offeror is the master of the offer, an acceptance that does not
conform to the offer is not effective. 285 Thus, the irrevocable offer
created by the lease extension option had lapsed. 28 6 The court also
concluded that equitable relief was improper because the delay had
caused sufficient prejudice to the lessor 287  and because literal
enforcement of the extension provision would not work an
unconscionable hardship on the lessee.
288
Peck of Chehalis, Inc. v. C. K. of Western America, Inc.
In Peck of Chehalis, Inc. v. C.K. of Western America, Inc.289 the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that a violation of the North
Dakota Franchise Investment Law290 does not entitle the franchisee
to rescind the franchise contract. 291 This was the first time the court
had considered section 51-19-12 of the North Dakota Century
Code, which subjects a franchisor to an action for rescission of a
franchise contract if the franchisor has violated the provisions of the
remedy of rescission provided by the statute is the ordinary remedy
remedy of rescision provided by the statute is the ordinary remedy
of rescission. "293 The supreme court held that equitable principles
will determine if the franchise contract should be set aside. 294 The
court also stated that the franchisee will be subject to any equitable
283. Id. at 562. Western Tire relied on Korey v. Sheff, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 266, 327 N.E.2d 896
(1975) and Fletcher v. Frisbee, 119 N.H. 555, 404 A.2d 1106 (1979), to support the proposition that
other modes of communication could be used for acceptance. 307 NW.2d at 562.
284. 307 N.W.2d at 563. The lease agreement provided in part that "Ja]ny notice . .. shall be
deemed to have been served only when such notice . . . has been deposited in a U.S. Post Office by
registered or certified mail." Id. at 560.
285. Id. at 563. See also N.D. Ct-NT. CODE § 9-03-18 (1975) (mode of communication of
acceptance and communication of consent).
286. 307 N.W.2d at 563.
287. Id. at 562. The court felt that inadequate rental paym-nis under the original lease
constituted sufficient prejudice to Skrede. Id.
288. Id. The court reasoned that because Western Tire could have continued the lease by merely
exercising a prompt acceptance. equitable intervention was not warranted. Id. The court concluded
ihat Western Tire had "fully received the equivalent of the price paid for the option" and, thus.
enforcement of the provision was not unconscionable. Id.
289. 304 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1981).
290. N.D. CENT. CooF. ch. 51-1 9 (Supp. 1981).
291. Peck ofChchalis. Inc. v. C.K. of Western Atcrica. Inc., 304 N.W.2d 91,98 (N.D. 1981)
292. ld at 95. Section 51-19-12 oftthe North l)akota Cenury Code provides in part that "fainy
person who violates an' provisioi of this chapter or any rute or order issued by the commissioner
hereundcr shall be liable to the franchisee or subittaichisor wiIo my bring an action for damages,
for rescission, or for such other relicfas the court may deeii appropriate. " N.D. CENT. CODF. 51-
19-12(l )(Supp. 1981).
293. 304 N.W.2d at 99.
294. Id.
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In Eddy v. Lee2 96 the North Dakota Supreme Court decided an
important case that concerned the validity of a liquidated damages
clause in a contract. The case arose out of an action by plaintiff to
recover an earnest money deposit that was retained by defendant as
liquidated damages. 297 Plaintiff and defendant had executed a sale
and earnest money agreement in which plaintiff agreed to purchase
a home from defendant. 298 The contract contained a provision that
provided for the earnest money deposit to be forfeited as liquidated
damages in the event of default. 299 Plaintiff did not purchase the
home and defendant retained the earnest money deposit.300 The
trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of defendant.
30 1
The issue confronted by the supreme court was whether the
earnest money forfeiture constituted valid liquidated damages or
whether the forfeiture was void under section 9-08-04 of the North
Dakota Century Code. 30 2 Section 9-08-04 provides that an
agreement fixing damages prior to a breach of contract is void
unless the parties agree upon "an amount presumed to be the
damage sustained by a breach in cases where it would be
impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage. "303
The court concluded that the word "presumed," as used in section
9-08-04, raised a rebuttable presumption of validity of liquidated
damages.30 4 However, in order for a party to raise the rebuttable
presumption, the court held that the party relying on the
presumption must first establish certain foundational facts. 30 5 The
supreme court stated that these foundational facts require a finding
that (1) the damages stemming from a breach of contract are
impractical or extremely difficult to ascertain at the time the
contract was executed, (2) there was a reasonable endeavor by the
295. Id. at 100-01.
296. 312 N.W.2d 326 (N.D. 1981).
297. Eddy v. Lee, 312 N.W.2d 326, 327 (N.D. 1981).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. The purchase price of the home was $40,000.00 with $5,000.00 as an earnest money
deposit. Id. Defendant sold the home for $43,000.00 one month after plaintiff's breach of contract.
Id.
301. Id. at 328.
302. Id
303. N.D. CENT. ConE § 9-08-04 (1975) (emphasis added).
304. 312 N.W.2d at 329-30.
305. Id. at 330.
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parties to fix their compensation, and (3) the amount stipulated
bears a reasonable relation to the probable damages and is not
disproportionate to any damages reasonably anticipated. 30 6 The
court also concluded that section 32-03-14 of the North Dakota
Century Code, which deals with damages in realty contracts, is
another factor that must be considered in determining whether the
liquidated damages clause in a realty contract is valid. 30 7 Because
findings of fact as to the foundational facts were necessary to raise
the rebuttable presumption of validity, the supreme court held that
summary judgment was improper and, accordingly, the court




In Gulden v. Sloan 09 the North Dakota Supreme Court
addressed issues inherent in the creation and enforcement of an
oral contract. Gulden was financially unable to exercise an option
to purchase the home he had been leasing. Gulden entered into an
agreement with the homeowner which provided that Gulden could
attempt to sell the home and keep the amount of the purchase price
that exceeded Gulden's option price. 310 Subsequent to this
agreement, Gulden and Sloan entered into negotiations over the
purchase of the home. 311 Gulden alleged that Sloan offered to
transfer title of his mobile home to Gulden in return for Gulden's
abandonment of his option . 312 Sloan would then purchase the home
at the option price. A formal agreement between Sloan and Gulden
was never drafted. 31 3 Subsequent to the alleged agreement between
Sloan and Gulden, Sloan entered into an earnest money contract
with the homeowner to purchase the home at a price slightly less
than Gulden's option price. 314 After the execution of the earnest
money contract with the homeowner, Sloan moved into the home
and Gulden moved into Sloan's mobile home. 315 The parties helped
306. Id.
307. Id. at 330-31. Section 32-03-14 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that "[tihe
detriment caused by the breach of an agreement to purchase an estate in real property is deemed to
be the excess, if any, of the amount which would have been due the seller under the contract over the
value of the property." N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-14 (1976).
308. 312 N.W.2d at 331.
309. 311 N.W.2d568 (N.D. 1981).
310. Gulden v. Sloan, 311 N.W.2d 568, 569 (N.D. 1981).
3 I . Id.
312. Id. at 569-70.
313. Id. at 570.
314. Id. The earnest money contract between the homeowner and Sloan set the home price at
$61,556.62. Id. Gulden's option price was $62,400.00. Id.
315. Id.
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each other move and exchanged keys. 316  After repeated
unsuccessful attempts by Gulden to get Sloan to transfer the mobile
home's title, Gulden filed this action.
3 17
On appeal from the trial court's determination that an
enforceable oral contract had been created, the supreme court was
confronted with two issues: Whether the abandonment of the
option was sufficient consideration to support a contract and
whether the partial performance was sufficient to exempt the oral
contract from the statute of frauds. 318 Section 9-05-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides that sufficient consideration for a
contract is any benefit conferred or detriment suffered. 31 9 The
court stated that detriment may be sustained by the forbearance of
a legal right, regardless of the value of that legal right. 320 Although
Gulden was financially unable to exercise the option to purchase
the home, the court concluded that the option was a legal right and




In addressing the second issue the supreme court stated that in
order to determine whether an oral contract is exempted from the
statute of frauds, the court must look at all the facts and establish
whether the partial performance is explained by the contractual
relationship. 322 Although Sloan contended that the exchange of
residences was motivated by friendship with Gulden,3 23 the court
concluded that the exchange was consistent with the existence of a
contract. 324 Thus, the contract was excepted from the statute of
frauds because of partial performance.
3 25
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
State v. Lewis
In State v. Lewis326 the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that
316. Id.
317. Id. Gulden had commenced an action for specific perforiiaicc, requesting that the mobile
home's title be transferred. Id. Prior to the completion of the trial. Sloan transferred the mobile
home's title to another party, making the renedy of specific performance impossible. Id. The trial
court's judgment forGulden was in the amount of$6,000.00. Id.
318. Id. The court did not decide the issue of which of the three statutes of frauds in the North
)akota Century Code was applicable in this case. id. at 573. See N .D. CENT. (ODf 9-06-04 (1975):
id. 55 41-01-16, -02-08 (1968).
319. N.D. CENT. CODF. 9-05-01 (1975).
320. 311 N.W.2d at 572.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 574. Evideici a trial showicd that Sloan and Culden had known each oilier for 30
years. Id. it 569.
324. Id. at 574. lihe couiit ioncluded that the friendship I e{wevn Gulde (ilei i ( l ShNi as not so,
str(Iit, is t) explain allo sin Goiliden I(o live rent free in Slon;'s molch' hmw. H,.
325. Id
326. 302 N.W.2d 396 (N.I). 191). Ser Slae v. lewis. 310 N.\W .2d 211 N.I). 1990) (,aim "
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the constitutionality of a police photographic identification
procedure must be evaluated in light of the totality of surrounding
circumstances.3 27 The defendant in Lewis had been arrested for
robbery and photographed at the police station.3 2  The defe-
endant's photograph, along with six others, was shown to the
victim. 329 The victim identified the defendant as the man who
attempted to rob her. 330 In considering whether the photographic
display violated the defendant's due process rights, the Lewis court
considered the following factors: (1) Whether there was substantial
vagueness in the witness's original description; (2) whether
substantial discrepancies existed between the initial description and
the actual appearance of the defendant; (3) whether the defendant's
photograph was emphasized when shown to the witness; (4)
whether the witness was significantly uncertain of the defendant's
identity during the photographic display; (5) whether the police
indicated to the viewer that one of the pictured persons committed
the crime; and (6) the time span between commission of the crime
and the viewer's identification of the photographs. 3 1 Applying
these factors to the procedure used in Lewis the court held that the
display was not impermissibly suggestive and that it did not give
rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.
332
State v. Johnson
The North Dakota Supreme Court considered several cases in
which search and seizure issues were raised. In State v. Johnson333 the
defendant appealed his conviction of theft of property, alleging that
evidence used against him was illegally seized and should have been
suppressed. 334 The defendant lived in a mobile home, and the
stolen peoperty, a portable air compressor, was located outdoors
def-ndant was convicted of th crime f robber arising ou (darf .ttht rci'nt).
327, State v. Lewis. 302 N.W 2d 396. 398 (N.I) 1081)
328 Id. at 397
329. Id. at 398.
330. Id.
331 Id. In establishing the totality of the circumstatnc.s test thc North Dakota Supreome C oturt
relied on guidelines delineated in Simmons v. United States. 390 U.S. 377 (1968) and Neil s.
Biggers. 409 U.S. 188 (1972)
332. 302 N.W .2d a( 399. See a/uo State v. Iewis. 300 N.\'.2d 210. 217 (N.I), 1980) (satt
defendant appealed a separate robbery conviction). The coutit itt td'feindant's first appeal recthed
results similar to those in the second appeal. Id. In addfitio , the toturt it, the first appeal denied the
defendant's claim that he was entitled io representatim fut 'mi insel during he identifitatii
procedure. Id.
333. 301 N.W.2d 625 (N.D, 1981).
334. State vJohnson, 301 N.W.2d 625. 626 (NI). 1981).
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near an enclosed entryway to the mobile home.3 35 The supreme
court remanded the case for retrial, holding that the search and
seizure was unreasonable under the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution. 336  The holding was premised on
finding that the defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in
the area north of the entryway, 337 that the search did not fall within
one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, 338 and
that the doctrines of inevitable discovery and independent source
could not legitimize the search. 339 The defendant, therefore, was
entitled to a new trial at which the evidence, the air compressor,
would not be admissible.
State v. Nagle
In State v. Nagle340 the State appealed from the trial court's
order granting the defendant's motion to suppress evidence.3 41 In
Nagle police officers made a warrantless entry into a house and
arrested the defendants for delivery and possession of controlled
substances. 342 Concomitant with the arrest another officer obtained
a warrant, and a search pursuant to that warrant revealed
marijuana and methamphetamines. 343 The trial court relied on the
holding in Payton v. New York 3 "4 which stated that evidence must be
suppressed when it was seized pursuant to an illegal arrest. 345 The
335. Id.
336. Id. at 629-30.
337. Id. at 627-28. The court in.]ohnson stated that under the test set forth in Katz v. United
States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the defendant had a "qualified" expectation of privacy as to his
neighbors and an unqualified expectation of privacy as to the general public. 301 N.W.2d at 628.
338. 301 N.W.2d at 628. While there was probable cause to search, the court found that there
were no exigent circumstances which would excuse the officer's failure to secure a w-arrant, Id. at
628-29. Sre State v. Matthews. 216 N.W.2d 90 (N.). 1974) (exigent circumstances in a short-hand
term for the recognized exceptions to the search warrant requirement). S also State v. Klevgaard.
306 N W.2d 185. 193-94 (N.D. 1981) (plain view and automobile warrant reqiuirement exceptions
and the inevitabhe discovery doctrine considered): State v. Planz. 304 N.W.2t 74 (N. I). 1981)(plain
view and automobile exceptions considered).
339. 301 N.W.2d at 629. Sre State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769 (N.1. 1980) (North l)iokita
Supreme' Court reeognized the doctrine of inevitable discovery).
340. 308 N.W.2d 539 (N.1). 1981).
341. State v. Nagle. 308 N.W.2d 539. 540 (N.I). 1981)
342. Id. at 540-41.
343. Id.
344. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
345. 308 N.W.2d at 541. See Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). The Court in Pat'ton
held that a nonconsentual. warrantless entry into a suspect's house to make a routine loloy ar-est
violated the foirh aieniodment d. at 602-03. The court in Nagrl held that section 29-06-14 if tli
North Dakota Century Code was unconstitutional because it permitted the very conduct that was
proscribed in Patton. 308 N.\'.2dI at 541. Section 29-06-14 of the North l)akoa Cetury Ciode
provides as follows:
An officer may break open any door or window of a dwelling house to execute a
warrant ol'arrest. or to inake such arrest for a felony without w %arran., as is provided
in section 29-06-15. if. aftir notice of' his authority aid purpose, hi is refused
admiittanc e.
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North Dakota Supreme Court held that the motion to suppress
should not have been granted because the arrest was not routine.3 46
Rather, the likelihood of destruction or removal of evidence
constituted a sufficient exigent circumstance to permit a
warrantless entry to make a felony arrest. 347 Notwithstanding the
consideration of exigent circumstances, the court in Nagle also held
that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence because it was
independently discovered pursuant to a valid search warrant.3 48
Accordingly, the evidence should not have been suppressed




In State v. McDowelP50 questions were certified to the North
Dakota Supreme Court35 ' by a county court of increased
jurisdiction. The questions asked whether it is constitutional to
impose strict criminal liability for issuing a check without an
account or with insufficient funds, and if strict liability is
permissible, whether due process is offended by imposition of
imprisonment and fines for a violation. 352 The court in McDowell
held that it was proper for the legislature to enact section 6-08-16 of
N. I . GEr. Conw § 29U-06-14 (1974). Section 29-t6-t Sof the North I )akota Century Code provides
in part that "fal peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person . . . Iwihen the person arrested
has committed a felony, although not in the officer's presence." Id. § 29-06-15 (Supp. 1981).
346. 308 N. W. 2d at 542.
347. Id. at 544. See State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 117 (N.I). 1979) (exigent circtumstanes in
the context ofa warrantless arrest defined as an ciliergtntv sitoltito requiring swift action ito prevtt
danger to lift', serious datmage to property. escape of t snspect ti iest rutiction jevident'e). (. State
X Matthews. 216 N.W.2d 90. 100 (N.). 1974) (in context if warrantless sarch. exi etnt
circumstances is a short-hand term for recognized warrant exceptions such as border search, consent
search and plain view).
348. 308 N.W .2d at 545.
3 t-9. -l at 547.
350. 3 12 N.W.2d 301 (N. 11981).
351. State v. McDowell, 312 N.W-2d 301. 302 (N.I). 1081 ). The iluestiois were certified to fit'
siltcin coiiurt pursuant to rule 47. I if the North l)akota Rules if Apptellate Proctdure. Role 47.
provides in part, as follows: "Any district court or county court with increased jurisdiction in its
discretion may submit a question of law pursuant to Section 32-24-01, N.D.C.C., to the sutreti
-court for final determination by the use of a certification order." N.D.R. APP. P. 47. l(a). Section
32-24-01 of the North Dakota Century Code provides as follows:
Where any cause is at issue, civil or criminal, in any district court or county court
in this state and the issue of the same will depend principally or wholly on the
citostruction of the law applicable thereto, and such construction oir intcrprettiin is in
doubt and vital, or of great moment in the tcause, the judge of'any such court, on the
application of the attorney for the plaintiffor defendant in a civil cause, and upon the
aplplication of the attorneys for the plaintiff and ilefendant ill a cri ini l C;iise. luItV
halt all trotceedings until such question shall have been crtifirid to the supretie court
aind liv it deteriined.
N. I) C v .. t . (C(iuE § 32-24-01 (Supp. 1981).
352. 312 N.W.2d at 302.
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the North Dakota Century Code, which makes it a strict liability
offense to write checks without an account or with insufficient
funds." 53 This holding was anchored in the conclusion that the bad
check law was a regulatory scheme, instituted to protect the use of
checks in the flow of commercial business. 354 In conjunction with
the court's affirmative answer to the first question, it held that due
process was not offended by imposition of fines and imprisonment
for violation of a regulatory statute. 355 "The regulatory provisions
would be an exercise in futility if there were no sanctions for non-
compliance. "356
State v. Sheldon
In the area of criminal law the North Dakota Supreme Court
in State v. Sheldon357 . held that the statutory minimum prison
requirements for armed offenders were not applicable when
possession of a firearm was not an essential element of the crime
charged and when the jury did not make a special finding regarding
the defendant's possession of a firearm. 358 The defendant in Sheldon
wounded a sheriff's deputy with a firearm and was charged with
attempted murder. 359 A jury found the defendant guilty of reckless
endangerment, and the State contended that the minimum
sentencing statute applied.3 60 The supreme court disagreed. The
53. Id. it 1306. Seiti in 6-08-16 ol'iv Not i l)Iakoti Ceiiury ( ,,de pIu id's as tolows:
Any person who. .s mikes. draws, utters. or delivers any check. draft, or order for the
paymen of mioney upin a bank. bankcr, or depository. and at the Time of such
making. uiitwii. t ering (i- dclivcry. or at The time of' presentation fr payiment if
tmade within one week after the original delivery thereof, has not sufficient foods in (it
credit with such bank. banker, or depsitory to incit sut i1 check. draft, or order in fill
upon its presentation, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-08-16(1) (Supp. 1981). Cf State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1980).
The court in Carpenter held that the felony bad check law was unconstitutional because an intent to
defraud was implied and because it denied equal protection. Id. at 110-11. See also N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 6-08-16.2 (Supp. 1981) (felony bad check statute). Dicta in Carpenter suggested that the court was
concerned that the felony bad check statute imposed criminal sanctions in the absence of proof of
mental culpability. 301 N.W.2d at 110. The court in McDowell dismissed those concerns by stating
that the regulatory nature of the misdeameanor bad checks statute allowed such sanctions. 312
N.W.2d at 306-07.
354. 312 N.W.2d at 306.
155. ifl.
", 56. '[he dli'iltndat also alegied that section 6-09-16 o f iII,' North Dl)akota (entur o ( d
%iolatd ii North )akta c nstitutional pro isisits proscribing itIItrisotnIiet lor delt. Id. at 307.
.Sr N.I). ,C( s'I . art. I. § 15. The AlI)sti.,i icourt rejected this argittuit, stating that thc pcnalty %s%,i
Iiir writing a cseck, not lir ftiling toi nm ke satisfactioi lotr it. 312 N \V.2d at 307.
157. 312 N.W.2d 367 (N. I). 1981).
3511. Statc v. Sheldotn. 312 N.W .2(1 367, 70 (N. I). 1(1811
359- Id. at 368.
361). Id. at 368-69. Thc stattic tirgilitig mtituiiiiIII seItcnc,s for arned nff'rrdtrs provides as
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, minimum terms of imprison-
ment shall be imposed upon an offender and served without benefit of parole when, in
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court reasoned that because penal statutes are to be strictly
construed and because the minimum sentencing statute expressly
required proof that a firearm was involved, the statute applies only
if the possession of a firearm is an essential element of the crime
charged or if the trier of fact makes a special finding that the
defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of the
offense. 361 In Sheldon the .jury made no special finding of the fact.
Moreover, possession of a firearm is not an essential element of the
crime of reckless endangerment. Accordingly, the defendant in
Sheldon was not subject to the minimum sentencing statute.
362
Another issue raised by the State in Sheldon was whether the trial
court abused its discretion by granting the defendant's motion for
reduction of his sentence.3 63 The court also rejected this claim,
stating that the record did not indicate that the trial court had
abused its discretion in granting the motion.
364
State v. Helieson
In State v. IIelgeson365 the court considered the role of the tacit
admission rule in a criminal proceeding. The court in Hegeson held
that the defendant's tacit admission could be used as evidence
against him and that such use did not violate his fifth amendment
privilege against self incrimination. 366 In Helgeson the defendant
was the driver of an automobile involved in a collision. 367 One of
two passengers in the automobile was killed. 68 At trial the
surviving passenger testified that, shortly after the collision, he
verbally accused the defendant of killing his friend and that the
defendant made no response. 369 The Helgeson court held that when a
statement is made by a person in the presence of a party to the
action, and that statement contains assertions which, if untrue, the
party would under all circumstances naturally be expected to deny,
the course of committing an offense, he inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury upon
another, or threatens or menaces another with imminent bodily injury with a
dangerous weapon, an explosive, or a firearm. Such minimum penalties shall apply
only when possession of a dangerous weapon, an explosive, or a firearm has been
charged and admitted or found to be true in the manner provided by law....
N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-32-02.1 (Supp. 1981).
361. 312 N.W.2d at 369-70.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 371. See N.D. CRIM. P. 35 (correction or reduction of sentence).
364. 312 N.W.2d at 372.
365. 303 N.W.2d 342 (N.D. 1981).
366. State v. Helgeson, 303 N.W.2d 342, 348 (N.D. 1981). See Starr v. Morsette, 236 N.W.2d
183 (N.D. 1975) (tacit admission rule applied in context of civil proceedings).
367. 303 N.W.2d at 344.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 345.
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the party's failure to speak constitutes an admission. 37 0 The court
stated that use of the tacit admission rule did not violate a criminal
defendant's right to remain silent when the admission occurred
prior to arrest.371 Therefore, even though the tacit admissions in
He4eson occurred prior to the defendant's arrest, evidence of the
defendant's silence was admissible at trial.
37 2
State v. Red Paint
The defendant in State v. Red Paint37 3 was a resident of a group
home for juveniles. Frank Bell was the executive director of the
* home. 374 The defendant was arrested in connection with a murder
investigation but before he was given Miranda warnings, he
confessed to Bell that he had committed the murders.3 75 At trial and
on appeal the defendant maintained that evidence of the
conversation between himself and Mr. Bell was .not admissible
because it was privileged. 37 6 Both the trial court and the North
Dakota Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim of privilege,
reasoning that rules of privilege should be narrowly construed
because they are in derrogation of the search for truth.377  In
reaching its decision the court in Red Paint applied the rule of
narrow construction to rule 502 (lawyer-client privilege) and rule
505 (clergyman privilege) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence
and to section 31-01-06.1 of the North Dakota Century Code
(certified school counselor privilege). 37 8 The court concluded that
because no privilege had been granted to the relationship in the
370. Id. at 347 (citing Starr v. Morsette, 236 N.W.2d 183 (N.). 1975)). This is the so-called
tacit admission rule.
37 1. Id. The court in Helkeson drew the line at arrest, noting that Miranda warnings convey to the
defendant an assurance that his silence after arrest bears constitutional protection. Id.
372. Id. at 348 (citing.jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 241 (1980) (Stevens,.J., concurring)).
373. 311 N.W.2d 182 (N.D. 1981).
374. State v. Red Paint, 311 N.W.2d 182, 183 (N.D. 1981).
375. Id.
376 311 N.W.2d at 183-85. See State v. Mehralian, 301 N.W.2d 409, 417 (N.D. 1981) (evi-
dentiary rule of privilege does not apply to section of criminal trespass statute referring to privilege).
377. 311 N.W.2d at 185 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683. 710 (1974)).
378. 311 N.W.2d at 184-85. A pertinent part of rule 502 provides as follows: "A client has a
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the
client .... " N.D.R. Evto. 502(b). Rule 505 provides, in part, as follows: "A person has a privilege
to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the
person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual adviser." N.D.R. Evto. 505(b).
Section 31-01-06.1 of the North Dakota Century Code provides, in part, as follows:
For the purpose of counseling in a school system, any elementary or secondary
school counselor possessing a valid North Dakota guidance credential . . .shall be
legally immune from disclosing any privileged or confidential communication made to
such counselor in a counseling interview.
N.D. CF\.T COD§ 31-01-06.1 (1976).
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instant case, the trial court did not err in allowing Mr. Bell to testify
to the details of his conversation with the defendant.
379
Schneider v. Ewing
The North Dakota Supreme Court refused to extend the scope
of rule 46 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure
380 in
Schneider v. Ewing.381 To prevent overcrowding in a county jail, a
county court judge issued a continuing order sua sponte
382 in the
name of the State of North Dakota.38 3 The order was directed to the
county sheriff, requiring him to transport prisoners to another jail
when overcrowding conditions occurred. 38 4 When this order was
not followed, the county court judge issued sua sponte an order for
the sheriff to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
3 5
The sheriff applied to the North Dakota Supreme Court seeking a
writ of prohibition restraining the county judge from holding a
contempt hearing. 386
In allowing the writ to issue, the court found that under the
recently enacted chapter 12-44.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code, 387 rulemaking authority relating to jails within the state was
removed from the jurisdiction of the courts and was vested in the
attorney general. 388 Even though the county court judge's actions
were laudable, the court found that any corrective action
concerning jail conditions should have been initiated by the
attorney general. 38 9 Therefore, in the absence of a proper legal
action, the court held that the county court judge had neither
subject matter jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction over the county
sheriff. 390 The court decided that, since the county court lacked
jurisdiction to issue the orders and since the county court .judge was
379. 311 N.W.2dat 186.
380. N.D.R. CRisi. P. 45.
381. 310 N.W.2d 581 (N.D. 1981).
382. Sua sponte is defined to mean "folt his or its own will or motion; voluntarily; without
prompting or suggestion." BLACKS LAW DICTiONARY 1277 (5th ed. 1979).
383. Schneider v. Ewing, 310 N.W.2d 581, 582 (N.D. 1981).
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 583.
387. N.D. CENT. CooEch. 12-44.1 (Supp. 1981).
388. 310 N.W.2d at 584. See N.D. CENT. CoDE § 12-44.1-24(Supp. 1981).
389. Id. at 584-85. The county judge based his authority on rule 46 of the North Dakota Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which states in part that "It~he court ordering defendants.. detained shall
exercise supervision over the detention of those defendants . . . pending trial, for the purpose of'
eliminating all unnecessary detention." N.D.R. CRUs. P. 46(i). The court found, however, that rule
46 only applied to detainees under a court's supervision because of a pending action in that court.
310 NW.2d at 584.
390. 310 N.W.2d at 584.
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involved in the proceedings, it would not require the county sheriff
to undergo a contempt hearing.3 91 The court believed that such a
hearing would not provide the county sheriff with a disinterested




Dobervich v. Central Cass Public School District No. 17
Sam Dobervich was informed by letter on March 31, 1977,
that his teaching contract had not been renewed for the 1977-78
school year. 394 Subsequently, Dobervich served the school board
with a summons and complaint alleging that the reasons for
nonrenewal were insufficient, frivolous, and arbitrary and that they
did not relate to his ability, competence, or qualifications as a
teacher. 395 Dobervich demanded and received a jury trial at which
the jury found for him and awarded him damages. 396 The school
district appealed to the supreme court. 397 The case was remanded
by the supreme court. On remand the trial court concluded that the
procedural steps required by statute were followed and that under
the facts, a nonrenewal was authorized. 39 8 The supreme court
391. Id. at 586.
392. Id. The court believed that since the county court judge initiated the proceedings and since
he wa s personally involved in the proceedings, it would be unlikely that the county sheriff would be
provided with an appropriately objective contempt determination. Id.
393. Id. "A writ of prohibition is to be used sparingly and only in cases where there is an
inadequate remedy by appeal, or in those cases where other equitable principles justify its use." Id.
(quoting Davis v. O'Keefe, 283 N.W.2d 73, 76 (N.D. 1979)). See N.D. CENT. CODE 32-35-02
(1976) (statute governing issuance of writs of prohibition).
394. Dobervich v. Central Cass Pub. School Dist. No. 17, 302 N.W.2d 745, 747 (N.D. 1981).
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. On Dobervich's first appeal the court concluded that Dobervich was not entitled to a
jury trial as a mater of right. Dobervich v. Central Cass Pub. School Dist, No. 17, 283 N.W.2d 187,
193 (N.D. 1979). Rather the court determined that the trial court should review the nonrenewal
decision to decide if the procedural steps required by statute were followed and if' nonrenewal was
authorized. Id.
398. 302 N.W.2d at 748. The pertinent statute in Dobervich is section 15-47-38(5) of the North
Dakota Century Code which provides in part:
The school board of any school district contemplating not renewing a teacher's
contract . . . shall notify the teacher in writing of such contetmplated nonrenewal no
later than April first. The teacher shall be informed in writing of the time, which shall
not be later than April seventh, and place of a special school board meeting for the
purpose of discussing and acting upon such contemplated nonrenewal. The teacher
shall also be informed in writing of the reasons for nonrenewal. The reasons shall be
sufficient to justify the contemplated action of the board and shall not be frivolous or
arbirrarv but shall be related to theability, competence, or qualifications of the teacher
as a teacher, or the necessities of the district such as lack of Funds calling for reduction
in the teaching staff. At the meeting with the board the teacher may then produce such
'vidence as may be necessary to evaluate the reasons for nonrenewal, and either party
may produce witnesses to confirm or refute the reasons. The school board shall give an
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affirmed the trial court decision. 399
During the second appeal Dobervich questioned the role of the
trial court and its scope of review in cases involving the nonrenewal
of teaching contracts. The supreme court stated that the trial court
was not limited to determining whether the notice requirements of
the statute had been met and whether a hearing was provided. It
was also to determine, on the facts of the case, whether a
nonrenewal was authorized. 400 The court recognized that the trial
court cannot subsitute its judgment for that of the school board,
and concluded that, beyond procedural matters, the trial court's
review is limited.40 1 The court concluded that when a trial court
reviews the reasons for nonrenewal of a teacher's contract, it is
limited to the following: (1) Determining whether the reasons given
are in accordance with statutory provisons, i.e., not frivolous and
arbitrary; and (2) determining if those reasons are legally sufficient,
i.e., not an abuse of the school board's discretion.
40 2
The court also construed section 15-47-38(5) of the North
Dakota Century Code. 40 3 The section was interpreted to mean that
after the board has given the teacher written notice of its
contemplated action, it may not articulate new or additional
reasons for its actions at the hearing, nor may it rely upon reasons
explained in the hearing which were not contained in the notice to
the teacher. 404 Furthermore, this section permits the teacher to
produce such evidence at the hearing as may be necessary to
evaluate the reasons for the nonrenewal.
40 5
Fercho v. Montpelier Public School District No. 14
In the spring of 1980 the Montpelier School District faced
financial problems due to a decline in enrollment.40 6 As a result, the
board did not renew four teachers' contracts.407 One of the
teachers, Lucille Fercho, commenced an action in district court
opposing the nonrenewal of her teaching contract, and she
explanation and shall discuss and confirm at the meeting its reasons for the
contemplated nonrenewal ofthe contract.
N. . CENT. Cor, § 15-47-38(5) (1981).
399. 302 N.W.2d at 754.
400. Id. at 748.
401. Id. at 7 51.
402. Id. at 751-52. The court found that abuse ofdiscretion was the propter standard of review to
be applied by the trial court. Id. at 752.
403. Id. at 750. Seesupra note 398 for the text of section 15-47-38(5).
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Fercho v. Montpelier Pub. School Dist. No. 14, 312 N.W.2d 337. 338 (N.Dl. 1981).
407. Id.
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prevailed in that action. 40 8 The school district appealed, asserting
that the trial court improperly substituted its judgment for that of
the school board.409
The supreme court stated that a trial court's review is limited
to procedural matters - determining whether the reasons for
nonrenewal are frivolous or arbitrary and determining if the
reasons for nonrenewal are legally sufficient. 41 0  In Fercho the
supreme court found that there was no abuse of discretion since the
board informed Fercho of the contemplated nonrenewal and that
the reduction in staff was due to financial problems.
411
Furthermore, there was no dispute that the school district lacked
funds or that there was a need to reduce the teaching staff.41 2 In
addition, the court found that the failure of the board to ask Fercho
if she was interested in a part-time position when she repeatedly
requested a full-time position was not arbitrary.
41 3
Fercho contended that her position should have been protected
by the school district's "reduction in force" policy. 4 14 However,
the court found that the policy did not apply to her for two reasons:
(1) The reduction in force policy speaks to retention and not
rehiring; and (2) Fercho could have applied for the part-time
teaching position for which a teacher with less tenure was hired.
41 5
Thus, the reduction in force policy did not require the board to
refrain from nonrenewing Fercho's contract, nor did it require
them to employ her in the part-time position available.
41 6
In a special concurrence Justice Vande Walle stated that the
reduction in force policy should have led the board to offer the part-
time position to Fercho, the teacher who had seniority and was
qualified for the position.4 1 7 But, in this instance, due to Fercho's
408. Id at 339.
409. Id
410. Id. at 340. The court cited Dobervich v. Central Cass Pub. School Dist. No. 17, 302
N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1981), as a previous decision that designated the trial court's scope of review in
cases dealing with the nonrenewal of teacher's contracts. 312 N.W.2d at 340.
411. 312 N.W.2d at 340.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 341.
414. Id. The reduction in force policy states that "preference in retention will be given to
teachers with the longest district service. " Id. at 341-42.
415. Id. at 342.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 342-43 (Vande Walle. .. , concurring specially). Justice Vande Walle stated:
Despite my concurrence with the majority opinion in this instance I believe that in the
future school boards which do not renew a teacher's contract because of financial
distress but create other full-time or part-time positions for which a nonrenewed
teacher is qualified should 'go the last mile' and affirmatively offer the nonrenewed
teacher the newly created position. Such affirmative action on the part of the school
board will be persuasive. at least to me, in instances in which it is alleged that the
school board did not act with fairness and decency or that the school board had ulterior
motives in not renewing the teacher's contract.
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insistence on a full-time position, the board was not obligated to
offer her the part-time position.
4 18
Lithun v. Grand Forks Public School District No. 1
Vernon Lithun was discharged by the school board for
insubordination. 419 He appealed from the judgment of the district
court dismissing his complaint, alleging a breach of contract by the
Grand Forks Public School District. 420 The main issue addressed
by the supreme court concerned a standard of conduct by which
teachers are to be guided when disciplining students.4 2 1 Lithun
argued that the school policy he allegedly violated was not
publicized to the teachers and that in itself it was vague.42 2 The
court found that although the policy may have been vague as to
other teachers, the record showed that Lithun was personally
instructed regarding the policy's application to him.4 2 3 Thus, it
should have been clear to Lithun that he must first secure the
approval of his principal before administering physical
punishment. 424 When Lithun continued to use physical force
without his principal's approval, he was insubordinate .
4 25
In addition, the court determined that a school board has the
authority to adopt policies to govern and discipline the students in
the school. 426 Such authority is vested in the school board by the
legislature and does not abrogate a teacher's defense to a criminal
action brought by a student,427 nor does it violate the teacher's
academic freedom.4 28 The court also found that a school board is
permitted to consider past events in the teacher's record in making
its decision regarding discharging a teacher.4 29 The school board is
418. Id. at 342.
419. Lithun v. Grand Forks Pub. School Dist. No. 1, 307 N.W.2d 545, 546 (N.D.,1981).
420. Id.
421. Id. at 551.
422. Id. The school district policy provided the following guide to good discipline: "Corporal
punishment, when necessary, should only be administered with the approval and under the




426. Id. at 552. The pertinent statute provides that school boards have the authority "[tlo
adopt, alter, and repeal, when it deems it expedient, rules and regulations for the reception,
organization, grading, government, and instruction of pupils. ... N.D. CENT. COOE S 15-29-
08(13) (1981).
427. 307 N.W.2d at 552. Section 12.1-05-05 of the North Dakota Century Code states
circumstances under which the use of force upon another person is justified. It provides: "A...
teacher. . may use reasonable force upon the minor for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting
his welfare, including prevention and punishment of his misconduct, and the maintenance of proper
discipline . . .The force used must not create a substantial risk of death, serious bodily injury,
disfigurement, or gross degradation." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(1) (1976).
428. 307 N.W.2d at 552.
•429. Id. at 553.
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not required to ignore past events that show an emerging pattern of





In re Estate of Snortland
Decedent died as a result of gunshot wounds. 43 ' The evidence
indicated that the decedent was intentionally and feloniously killed
by his son, who subsequently disappeared. 432 The decedent died
intestate and, at the time of death, owned real property in joint
tenancy with the son accused of the murder. 433 The county court of
Nelson County ordered that the decedent's grandson, the son of the
alleged murderer, be allowed to share in his grandfather's estate
and that the accused son be allowed to retain his one-half undivided
share of the joint tenancy property. 43 4 The district court
affirmed. 435 The personal representative of the decedent's estate
appealed two issues to the North Dakota Supreme Court: Whether
a joint tenant who feloniously kills his cotenant retains any interest
in the joint tenancy property, and whether the surviving issue of
one who feloniously kills another may share in the estate of the
deceased.4 3 6  The supreme court answered both questions
affirmatively and upheld the earlier rulings.
4 3
1
The North Dakota Supreme Court previously has held that the
severance of a joint tenancy creates a tenancy in common. 4 38
However, these earlier cases dealt with severance by a divorce
property settlement 439 and severance by a conveyance.4 4 0 The court
in Snortland applied the same principle to a severance by the
felonious killing of one joint tenant by a cotenant. By interpreting
section 30.1-10-03(2) of the North Dakota Century Code, 44 1 the
court held that this severance of a joint tenancy creates a tenancy in
common, with a one-half undivided interest in the jointly held
property passing to the decedent's estate, and the other one-half
430. ld
431. In re Estate of.Snortland, 311 N.W.2d 36, 37 (N.I). 1981).
432. Id.
433. Id. The decedent was survived by his wife; five children, including the son accused of the
murder: and a grandson. Id.
434. Id. Although the son accused of his father's murder was not married, he openly acknow-
ledtged having a son out of wedlock. No parties to this action contest this fact. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 38-39.
438. Renz v. Renz. 256 N.W.2d 883. 886 (N.D. 1977).
439. Id.
440. Robar v. Ellingson, 301 N.W.2d 653, 662 (N.D, 1981).
441. N.D. CENT. C E § 30.1-10-03(2) (1976) (effect ofhomicide on joint tenancies).
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undivided interest retained by the wrongdoer. 442 The court
emphasized that the interest retained by the alleged killer did not
give him "rights by survivorship" in derogation of section 30.1-10-
03(2) of the North Dakota Century Code. 443 Rather, the severance
of the joint tenancy extinguished his survivorship rights, since he now
had no chance of acquiring the whole property by survivorship.
444
The court noted that section 30.1-10-03(1) of the North
Dakota Century Code445 does not extend to joint tenancy
property. 446 Section 30.1-10-03(1) states that the estate of the
decedent "passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. ",441
The court determined that the legislature specifically enacted
section 30.1-10-03(2) to govern joint tenancies and that to apply
section 30.1-10-03(1) to this type of situation would be a mis-
application of the Code. 448 The court did apply section 30.1-10-
03(1) of the North Dakota Century Code in deciding whether the
surviving issue of one who feloniously kills another shares in the
estate of the decendent. 449 Section 30.1-10-03(1) mandates that the
estate be distributed as if the killer ''predeceased the decedent. ,
45 0
The Snortland court declared that although the killer was not entitled
to share in his victim's estate, the share he otherwise would have
taken passes as though he had predeceased his victim. 451 If the son
accused of the murder had predeceased his father, the grandson
would have been entitled to a share of his grandfather's estate by
representation under section 30.1-04-03(1) of the North Dakota
Century Code. 452 Even though a literal reading of section 30.1-10-
03(1) seems to prohibit any killer from receiving "benefits" from
his felonious acts and treats him as if he had predeceased his victim,
the North Dakota Supreme Court does not follow this
interpretation. 4 3 Despite the crime, felonious cotenants in North
Dakota retain their undivided interest and their issue, if an heir of
the decedent, take by representation.
Cudworth v. Cudworth
Decedent died intestate. His brother was appointed personal
442. 311 N.W.2d at 38.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1 -10-03(1) (1976) (effect of homicide on intestate succession).
446. 311 N.W.2dat39.
447. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03(1) (1976).
448. 311 N.W.2d at 39.
449. Id.
450I. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03(1) (1976).
451.311 N.W.2d at 39.
452. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30, 1-04-03(1) (1976) (intestate inheritance by lineal descend-
ants).
453. See 311 N.W.2d at 40 (Pederson,.I., dissenting).
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representative to the estate, which contained as its major asset 727
acres of land. 4 4 Before selling the land the personal representative
sent a letter to the heirs soliciting suggestions about how and to
whom the land should be sold. 45 5 The personal representative listed
four options, two of which he described as unworkable and
cumbersome. The fourth option was to sell the land to his son. 456
Several heirs responded to the personal representative's letter. 457
Nevertheless, the personal representative sold the land to his son. 458
The son borrowed half of the purchase price from his father, the
personal representative, and the other half from a bank. Later, the
son received a loan from the Farmers Home Administration and
repaid his father and the bank. 4 5 9 An heir contested the sale. 460 The
district court voided the sale and cancelled the mortgage because of
the breach of the personal representative's fiduciary duty. 461 The
personal representative appealed, and the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the sale of estate property by the personal
representative to his son was voidable under section 30.1-18-13 of
the North Dakota Century Code 462 and that the sale constituted a
breach of trust owed by the personal representative to the estate's
creditors and heirs.
463
The North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted section 30.1-
18-13 of the North Dakota Century Code464 in deciding whether
the trial court could void the sale of estate property by a personal
representative to his son. 465 Section 30.1-18-13 expressly states that
a sale of estate assets by a personal representative is voidable if
made to a spouse. 466 However, the statute does not expressly
include other family members. 467 The court declared that the
statute does not condone all sales of estate assets to family members
other than the spouse. 468 The court determined that a sale would be
voidable if it was affected by a substantial conflict of interest on the
part of the personal representative. 469 In this case, such a
454. Cudworth v. Cudworth, 312 N.W.2d 331. 332 (N1). 1981).
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 332-33.
458. Id. at 333.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 332.
462. Id. at 335. See N.D. Cent. Code § 30.1-18-13 (1976) (sale involving conflict of interest bv
personal representative is voidable).
463. 312 N.W.2d at 337.
464. N.D. CENT. COnE S 30.1-18-13 (1976).
465. 312 N.W.2d at 335.
466. Id. See N.D. CENT. CoDE § 30.1-18-13 (1976).
467. 312 N.W,2d at 335.
468. Id.
469. Id.
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substantial conflict was found. Prior to the sale, the personal
representative and his son both farmed; the personal representative
farmed his own land, and the son rented and farmed the parcel of
land in question. 70 During this time the father and son traded
equipment and services, and the son lived at home.4 7 1 In addition,
the father provided the interim financing that was necessary for the
son to buy the estate's land, but he did not record a mortgage
against the land for the amount of the loan.4 72 These circumstances
led the court to affirm the trial court's decision that the transaction
was affected by a substantial conflict of interest.4 7 3 Even though the
sale was not voidable per se, additional elements existed before the
sale to render the sale voidable and to support application of section
30.1-18-13 of the North Dakota Century Code.
4 74
The court also addressed the issue of whether a sale of estate
property by the personal representative to his son is a breach of the
trust imposed by section 13.1-18-11 of the North Dakota Century
Code.4 7 5 The court reasoned that because North Dakota Century
Code section 13.1-18-11 makes a personal representative a trustee
of the estate for the benefit of creditors and heirs, the
trustee/personal representative is governed by chapter 59-01 of the
North Dakota Century Code476 in addition to the provisions of title
30.1 of the Code. 477 The general rule is that a trustee may not take
part in any transaction in which he has an interest adverse to an
interest of his beneficiary.4 78 The Cudworth court held that the
transaction between the personal representative and his son
involved a substantial conflict of interest.4 7 9 Therefore, the sale to
the son was a fraud against the heirs, a breach of the personal
representative's fiduciary duty, and a violation of the trust imposed
by North Dakota Century Code section 30.1-18-11.480 The
personal representative should have sought court approval of the
sale, whereby notice to interested persons would have been
given. 48 ' Then the dissenting heirs could have expressed their
dissatisfaction with the alternatives presented by the personal






475. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE 3. 1-18-I1 (1976).
476. 312 NW.2d at 335. See N.D. CeNT. Cone ch. 59-01 (1960),
477. 312 N.W.2d at 335. See N.D. CENT. CODe tit. 30.1 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
478. 312 N.W.2d at 336. See N.D. CENT. CoDe § 59-01-11 (1960).
479 312 N.W.2d at 336,
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 337.
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intention of the Uniform Probate Code, which is to reduce the role
of the courts in the administration of estates. In addition, the case
does not limit the action of the personal representative. Personal
representatives do not have to seek court approval for every
transaction. Approval is needed only in cases, such as Cudworth, in
which the personal representative may have a substantial conflict of
interest in the transaction, in which the transaction would breach
his fiduciary duty to the heirs, or in which the personal





In State v. Larson484 a county court of increased jurisdiction
certified questions to the supreme court asking whether the State
must retain a sample of the defendant's breath taken at the time of
a breathalyzer examination for the defendant's independent
testing, and whether the chemical test ampoule from the
breathalyzer must be made available to the defendant for
independent testing.4 8 5 In response to the first question, the Larson
court held that the State was not required to make available to the
defendant a sample of the defendant's breath taken at the time of
the breathalyzer examination.4 86 This holding was based on the fact
that the North Dakota statute regarding qualifications to
administer tests protected the defendant's due process rights to a
fair trial by allowing the defendant to request tests for his own
use. 487
483. Id.
484. 313 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1981).
485. State v. Larson, 313 NW.2d 750, 751 (N.D. 1981). The procedure for certification of a
question of law is provided in section 32-24-01 of the North Dakota Century Code and rule 47.1 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure. N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-24-01 (Supp. 1981); N.D.R. App. P. 47.1.
See supra note 351 for the text ofsection 32-34-01 and rule 47. l.
486. 313 N.W.2d at 753.
487. Id. at 752-53. See N.D. CENT. CoDE S 39-20-02 (1980). Section 39-20-02 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides as follows:
Only a physician, or a qualified technician, chemist, or registered nurse acting at
the request of a law enforcement officer may withdraw blood for purpose of
determining the alcoholic content therein. This limitation shall not apply to the taking
of breath, saliva, or urine specimen. The person tested may have a physician, or a
qualified technician, chemist, registered nurse, or other qualified person of his own
choosing administer a chemical test or tests in addition to any administered at the
direction of a law enforcement officer. The failure or inability to obtain an additional
test by a person shall not preclude the admission of the test or tests taken at the
direction of sic] law enforcement officer. Upon the request of the person who is tested,
full information concerning the test or tests taken at the direction of the. law
enforcement officer shall be made available to him.
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The second certified question stemmed from the defendant's
claim that the State's failure to preserve the breathalyzer test
ampoule constituted suppression of favorable evidence by the
prosecution. 488 Notwithstanding authority to the contrary, 489 the
court in Larson held that the defendant must demonstrate that
suppression of the evidence occurred after a request, that the
evidence was favorable to the defense, and that the evidence was
material to show his due process rights were impinged by the
State's failure to produce the ampoule. 490 In Larson the court stated
that the defendant's claim could not prevail because there had been
no showing that tests of the used ampoule could produce evidence
which was either material or favorable to the defendant. 49 1 Barring
such a showing, the defendant failed to establish that his due
process rights had been violated.
492
Dahlen v. Landis
In Dahlen v. Landis93 the defendant in an assault and battery
case appealed from orders denying his motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The defendant
claimed that under rule 404(b) of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence, evidence of the plaintiff's prior violent conduct should
have been admitted to show the defendant had reason to defend
himself.4 94 The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's refusal to admit the evidence, stating that the probative
value of the evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect. 495
Similarly, the court in Dahlen upheld the trial court's refusal to
admit evidence of specific conduct under rule 608 or 405(b) of the
Rules of Evidence. The court stated that under the express terms of
rule 608(b), extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct may
not be used to attack the credibility of a witness. 496 Moreover, the
488. 313 N.W.2d at 753. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (due process violation for
prosecution to withhold, when requested, evidence which is favorable to the defendant).
489. See Lauderdale v. Alaska, 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976); People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641,527
P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974); State v. Michner, 25 Or. App. 523, 550 P.2d 449 (1976).
490. 313 N.W.2d at 754 (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972)).
491. 313 N.W.2d at 755-56.
492. Id. at 756.
493. 314 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 1981).
494. Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63, 70 (N.D. 1981). Rule 404(b) provides as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. However, it may be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
N.D.R. Evin. 404(b).
495. 314 N.W.2d at 70-71.
496. Id. at 71. Rule 608(b) provides in part as follows: "Specific instances of the conduct of a
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
trial court did not err in its refusal to admit evidence of the
plaintiff's conduct under rule 405(b). 497 The court in Dahlen stated
that instances of conduct are admissible under rule 405(b) when a
character trait is an essential part of the charge, claim, or
defense. 498  The court concluded that because the plaintiff's
character was not in issue, in the sense of rule 405(b), the trial court
did not err in excluding the evidence.
499
The final evidentiary issue raised by the defendant addressed
the use of a guilty plea in a criminal case as an admission in a civil
case when both arose from the same event. 500 The defendant's plea
of guilty was withdrawn subsequent to completion of a period of
probation, during which time imposition of a sentence was
deferred. 0 1 The court held that the policy of the suspended
sentencing law did not preclude the use of a guilty plea as an




In Sanford v. Sanford5 3 the former wife appealed from an
amended judgment of divorce entered in the district court, alleging
that the distribution of the marital estate was clearly erroneous.
50 4
The North Dakota Supreme Court cited section 14-05-24 of the
North Dakota Century Code, which states that when a divorce is
granted the court must "make such equitable distribution of the
real and personal property of the parties as may seem just and
proper. ' 50 5 The supreme court also emphasized that the district
court must consider a variety of factors in making a division of
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. " N.D.R. Evin. 608(b).
497. 314 N.W.2d at 71. Rule 405(b) provides as follows: "In cases in which character or a trait
ofc haracter of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made
of specific instances of his conduct." N.D. R. Evto. 405(b).
498. 314 N.W.2d at 71.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 72. See Heid v. Schafer, 140 N.W.2d 584, 587 (N.D. 1966).
501. 314 N.W.2d at 72-73. See N.D. CENT. COD. § 12-53-13 (Supp. 1981) (deferred imposition
of sentence).
502. 314 N..21 at 73. The Dahlen court also stated that rule 410 of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence was too narrowly drawn to preclude use of a guilty plea as an admission. Id. See N.D.R.
Evin. 410 (offer to plead guilty. nolo contendere: withdrawn plea of guilty).
503. 301 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1981).
504. Sanfod v. Sanford. 301 N.W.2d 118, 1-21 (N.D. 1981). This case was previously appealed
to the North Dakota Supreme Court. In Sanford v. Sanford, 295 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1980), the
supreme court held that the wife's acceptance of payments under the divorce decree did not act as a
Waisver ofhcr right to appeal front the judgment ofdivorce. 301 N.W.2d at 120.
505. 301 N.W.2d at 126: N.D. CE-N1. CooE S 14-05-24(1981).
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property. 506 The court relied upon these guidelines in its review of
the district court decision. 5 07
In holding the district court's property division clearly errone-
ous, the supreme court noted that the financial security achieved by
the parties was obtained through their mutual efforts.508
The court further noted that an equitable distribution of property
must account for the disparate income-producing capacities of the
parties.50 9 The court recognized that the former wife's income was
far less than the former husband's. 510 The court determined that in
order for the property division in this case to be equitable, the
former wife had to be awarded the marketable securities owned by
the parties, because these assets possess high tax advantages. 51 The
court also determined that the wife would receive the ninety-five
acre farm, which the parties had purchased from her parents.512
Kitchen v. Kitchen
In Kitchen v. Kitchen51 3 the state's attorney appealed on behalf
of the Fargo Regional Child Support Enforcement Unit from a
district court order. This order vacated a writ of attachment issued
and executed against Daniel Kitchen for contempt of court for
failing to pay child support as ordered by the court.5 14 Kitchen was
found in contempt on February 16, 1979.515 In March the district
court issued an order under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
506. 301 N.W.2d at 126. The factors to be considered in determining the division of property,
or in determining whether either party is entitled to alimony or child support, are as follows:
The respective ages of the parties to the marriage; their earning abilities; the duration
of the marriage and the conduct of each during the marriage; their station in life; the
circumstances and necessities of each; their health and physical condition: their
financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its value at that
time, its income-producing capacity, if any, and whether it was accumulated or
acquired before or after the marriage: and such other matters as may be material.
These factors have been referred to by the North Dakota Supreme Court as the Ruff-
Fischer guidelines.
Id. See Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D. 1966); Ruffv. Ruff. 78 N.D. 775, 52 N.W.2d 107
(1952).
507. 301 N.W. 2d at 126.




512. Id. at 127-28. Under the district court decree the wife had only been given an option to
purchase the farm property at any time up to january 1, 1990. for the sum of $30,000.00. Id. at 127.
The district court decree had primarily given the wife cash awards while awarding the husband the
bulk of the parties' real estate and stock holdings. Id.
513. 304 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1981).
514. Kitchen v. Kitchen, 304 N.W.2d 694, 695 (N.D. 1981). Since 1977 Kitchen repeatedly
failed to make child support payments as ordered by the court. The mother of the children had
assigned the support right to the Social Service Board ol North Dakota. Id.
515. Id. The referee also directed that a warrant of Kitchen's arrest be issued and that he be
incarcerated for 90 days. Id.
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of Support Act, transferring proceedings to Clay County,
Minnesota, the residence of Daniel Kitchen. 516 In May 1979, the
court reviewed the earlier findings in Cass County. 517 A warrant of
attachment was issued August 30, 1979, but was not served because
Kitchen resided in Clay County, Minnesota. 518  Once again
proceedings were transferred to Clay County, Minnesota. 519 In
Clay County on March 21, 1980, the court entered judgment for
the entire amount in arrears. 520 On August 21, 1980, the warrant
was served, and Kitchen was arrested and incarcerated in the Cass
County jail. 52 1 Kitchen applied for a writ of habeas corpus, the writ
was issued, and after a hearing the district court vacated the
warrant of attachment and discharged Kitchen. 522 The district
court interpreted section 27-10-03 of the North Dakota Century
Code to require the vacation of the warrant of attachment.
52 3
The issue in this case was whether the entry of a judgment in
another jurisdiction, Clay County, Minnesota, purges the
appellee, Daniel Kitchen, of an earlier finding of civil contempt of
court in Cass County, North Dakota, for failure to pay child
support. 524 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the district
court erred in its interpretation of section 27-10-03.525 The court
noted that section 14-08-07 of the North Dakota Century Code
specifically allows an adjudication of civil contempt for failing to
pay child support. 526 The court stated that the judgment entered in
516. Id.
517. Id. at 695. Kitchen requested a review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law made
on February 16. 1979. by the referee for Cass County. The district court affirmed these findings and
conclusions and issued a warrant of attachment on May 18. 1979. Id. On May 25, 1979, Kitchen
once again requested a review of the facts claiming that he was willing but unable to pay child
support and was, therefore, not in contempt of court. On May 29, 1979, the Cass County referee
a.gain determined that Kitchen was in contempt, but reduced the jail sentence from 90 to 30 days
since it appeared that Kitchen could not pay all the arrearages, Id.
518. Id.






525. Id. North Dakota Century Code section 27-10-03 describes what actions are punishable as
civil contempt. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-03 (1974).
526. 304 N.W.2d at 695. Relevant portions of section 14-08-07 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides as follows:
In any action wherein a court decrees that payments for child support or alimony
combined with child support be made, the court shall provide in its decree that such
payments be paid to the clerk of court as trustee for remittance to the recipient or
person or public agency providing support for such recipient . . . Whenever there is
failure to make the payments as required, the clerk of court shall send notice of the
arrears by registered or certified mail to be delivered only to such person ordered to
make the support or alimony payments. Upon proof of receipt of such notice, the clerk
of court shall, if payment of the entire arrearage has not been made to the clerk after
ten days from the date of proof of such receipt of such notice, request the district judge
of the judicial district, on a form provided by such judge, to issue a citation for
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Clay County, Minnesota, pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, was an additional remedy rather than
a substitution for the remedy provided in section 14-08-07.527 The
court further stated that the determination that Kitchen was in civil
contempt of court in Cass County was prior to the entry of the
judgment in Clay County.5 28 The court emphasized that the
subsequent entry of the judgment in Minnesota did not purge
Kitchen of contempt resulting from his disobedience of the North
Dakota court's order. 
529
Miller v. Miller
In Miller v. Miller530 the former wife appealed from an
amended judgment of the district court changing custody of one of
the parties' daughters from her to her former husband. 53 When the
parties were divorced the father was awarded custody of one son,
and the mother was awarded custody of the two daughters. 53 2 The
father had experienced difficulty exercising his visitation rights
because of the mother's uncooperative attitude. 533 For example, the
mother took a trip to Colorado with the daughters without
informing their father. 34 The district court awarded the father trial
custody of one of the daughters for a year. 535 The court later
awarded permanent custody of the child to the father, stating only
that the year spent with the father was "beneficial. "536
contempt of court against such person who has failed to make such payments and the
citation shall be served on such person as provided by the rules of civil procedure.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-08-07(1)(1981).
527. 304 N.W.2d at 696.
528. Id.
529, Id. at 697.
530 305 N.W.2d 666 (N.D. 1981).
531. Miller v. Miller, 305 N.W.2d 666, 668 (N.D. 1981).
532. Id. The mother and the two girls moved to Jamestown, North Dakota. The father and son
stayed in Minnesota where the parties had lived prior to the divorce. Id.
533. Id. Because the father had experienced difficulties exercising his visitation rights, he moved
that the Minnesota court which had granted the divorce reduce his child support obligations. The
court entered an order to that effect. Id.
534. Id. at 669.
535. Id. Three days after the Minnesota court had granted the father's motion for reduction of
child support, he filed an action in the North Dakota district court seeking a custody change for both
daughters. The trial court denied his request and instead set forth detailed visitation rights regarding
one of the daughters and ordered the mother to cooperate with the father in his attempts to exercise
those rights. Id. at 668.
Nearly two years later, the father again filed a motion with the district court requesting that he
be awarded custody of the children. He alleged continued frustration of his visitation rights as a basis
for the change. Id. The mother denied that the events which the father claimed had occurred had
ever taken place. Id. At the hearing the father's motion, the district court concluded that the
mother's conduct had been wrongful and awarded trial custody of one of the daughters to the father,
providing specific visitation rights for the mother. Id. at 669.
536. Id. at 670. The mother had filed a motion to review the court order and requested full
custody of the daughter subject to reasonable visitation rights of the father. Id. at 669. The district
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In reversing the district court's judgment, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that there were no changed circumstances
sufficient to support a modification of the original custody order.
537
The court stated that the burden of showing changed circumstances
affecting the best interests of the daughter was upon the father
when he first moved for a change in custody and was awarded a one
year trial custody. The court emphasized that the burden remained
on the father in this subsequent action. 538 The court stated that the
record was insufficient to support a finding of significant changed
circumstances, and therefore, since there had been no showing that
the daughter's best interests had been affected to a significant
extent, the trial court could not conclude that custody should be
changed.5 39 The North Dakota Supreme Court emphasized that the
paramount consideration regarding custody matters is the best
interests and welfare of the child. 540 The court noted that neither
the findings of fact nor the conclusions of law of the district court
action had made any reference to the daughter's best interests.
54 1
Burtch v. Burtch
In Burich v. Burtch542 the former wife who had remarried
petitioned the district court for an amended judgment to permit her
to change the residence of the children from North Dakota to
Kansas. 54 3 The district court issued an order amending the original
judgment. This order continued custody in the mother, authorized
the change in residence, and modified the visitation and support
rights of the father. 544 The father appealed from the order for
amended judgment. 545 The father urged the North Dakota
Supreme Court to interpret section 14-09-07 of the North Dakota
Century Code to require "exceptional circumstances" before a
custodial parent is permitted to remove the children from the
court awarded full and permanent custody to the father despite the daughter's expressed preference
to remain with her mother. Id. at 670.
537. Id. at 674.
538. Id. at 673.
539. Id. at 673-74.
540. Id. at 672.
541. Id.
542. 314 N.W.2d 82 (N.D. 1981).
543. Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82, 83 (N.D. 1981). The mother desired to move to Kansas.
to be with her new husband who had purchased a workover rig there for working in the oil fields. Id.
at 88.
544. Id, at 83.
545. Id. The father failed to appeal from the final amended judgment, and the time for that
appeal had elapsed by the time the North Dakota Supreme Court heard the case. Id. However, the
supreme court allowed the father to present oral argument as though he were appealing from the
amended judgment. Id. The court issued a caveat to the effect that review of the merits should not be
considered a precedent in the future. Id.
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state. 5 46 The court declined to do so.
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that section 14-09-07
mandates that the trial court allow what is in the best interests of
the children. 547  In reaching its decision, the supreme court
reviewed some of the significant North Dakota statutes and case
law. 548  The court noted that other jurisdictions also con-
sider the best interests of the child as the primary factor in
determining whether a custodial parent may change the residence
of the child.5 4 9 The court stated that in this case the trial court had
considered the need of the children to maintain a good relationship
with their father and had sought to foster such a relationship by
allowing liberal visitation during the summer months and during
the children's school vacations. 550 The court noted that the trial
court had attempted to lessen the father's hardship resulting from
the children's change of residence by requiring the mother to pay
for the children's summer trip to North Dakota and by reducing
support payments during the months when the children would be
living with their father. 551 After reviewing the evidence, consisting
of testimony and affidavits, the supreme court concluded that the
trial court could reasonably have determined that the children's
546. Id. at 84. A custodial parent is allowed to change the residence of a child to another state
subject to the provisions of section 14-09-07 of the North Dakota Century Code which provides as
follows:
A parent entitled to the custody of a child shall not change the residence of the
child to another state except upon order of the court or with the consent of the
noncustodial parent, where the noncustodial parent has been given visitation rights by
the decree; however, a court order shall not be required if the noncustodial parent has
not exercised such visitation rights for a period of one year.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-09-07 (1981). Prior to 1979 that section of the North Dakota Century Code
read as follows: "A parent entitled to the custody of a child has a right to change his residence,
subject to the power of the district court to restrain a removal which would prejudice the right or
welfare of the child." 314 N.W.2d at 84 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-09-07 (1971) (amended
1979)).
547. 314 N.W.2d at 85. The supreme court noted that under the 1979 amendment to section 14-
09-07 of the North Dakota Century Code the burden of securing an order for a change in residence of
a child appears to be upon the custodial parent. Id. at 84-85. However, the court continued its
analysis of the statute by stating that the best interests of the child should still be the primary issue in
deciding whether to permit a change in residence. Id. at 85.
548. Id. at 85-87. The supreme court cited Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 125 (N.D. 1980),
for the proposition that the best interests and welfare of the child must dictate custody in divorce
actions. 314 N.W.2d at 85. The court also cited section 14-09-06.2 of the North Dakota Century
Code which lists ten factors to be considered by the court in determining the best interests and
welfare of the child. 314 N.W.2d at 85.
549. 314 N.W.2d at 85. The North Dakota Supreme Court citied and reviewed the following
cases: Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 463 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981). 314 N.W.2d at
85-86; Matter of the Marriage of Smith and Smith, 290 Or. 567, 624 P.2d 114 (1981); Matter of
Ehlen, 303 N.W.2d 808 (S.D. 1981).
550. 314 N.W.2d at 88. The trial court order amending the original divorce judgment provided
that the children would spend six weeks every summer and seven days every other Christmas
vacation with their father. Other than the two times mentioned, the children would remain in their
mother's custody subject to reasonable visitation rights to be exercised by their father. Id. at 83-84.
551. Id. at 88.
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best interests would be served by allowing the custodial parent to
remove them from the state.
5 52
Jacobson v. Jacobson
InJacobson v. Jacobson553 the former husband appealed from a
judgment of divorce entered by the district court that awarded
custody of the parties' children to their mother. 554 The issue on
appeal was the mother's sexual preference. 555 The mother freely
admitted to a homosexual relationship with a woman fifteen years
younger than herself.5 56 This relationship had taken place during
her marriage and was continuing at the time of trial and appeal to
the North Dakota Supreme Court.557 The mother and her lover
planned to continue living together with the parties' children.
558
After determining the facts, the trial court identified two areas
of concern: Whether the children would suffer from the disapproval
of society, and whether the children would have an increased
likelihood of becoming either homosexual or bisexual as a result of
their mother's homosexual preference.5 59 With respect to the first
issue, the trial judge stated that the children would be required to
deal with the problem created by their mother's homosexually
regardless of which parent had custody. 560 With respect to the
second concern, the trial judge noted that available case law tends
to regard homosexuality of a parent as a factor to be considered in
awarding custody, or to conclude, based upon expert testimony,
that homosexuality is irrelevant. 561 The court then determined that
the sexual preference issue could be a factor only if the evidence
provided some way of weighing that factor with the other factors,
which together make up the criteria for determining the children's
552. Id.
553. 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981).
554..Jacobson v..Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 78 (N.D. 1981). The trial court had determined
that the best interests of the children required that they remain with their mother. Id. at 79. The trial
judge had found that there would be less disruption under this arrangement from the standpoint of
schooling and from the standpoint of avoiding a change in the parent with whom the children had
spent most of their time and from whom they had received most of their upbringing. Id.
555. Id. The father contended on appeal that the trial court had erred in awardingcustody of the
children to their mother. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id. at 81. The mother admitted to an adulterous sexual relationship with her female lover
prior to the termination of her marriage. Id. at 80. In paragraph nine of the trial court's findings the
Judge noted that the women had been discreet about their relationship. He characterized it as a
"positive" one and he further stated that several people were aware of the relationship and that at
some point the children would become aware of it as well. Id. at 80-81.
558. Id. at 80. The supreme court noted that the fact that the two women intended to live
together permanently was a cause for "concern." Id.
559. Id. at 79.
560. Id.
561. Id.
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best interests. 62 The trial judge found that the mother was fit,
willing, and able to assume the custodial role and awarded the
children to her.
563
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed that portion of the
trial court judgment which placed the children in their mother's
custody. 564 The supreme court emphasized that it does not set aside
a custody award unless it is left with "a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. "565 The court stated that it was
"convinced" that such a mistake had been made in this case. 566
The supreme court noted that although homosexuality is more
accepted today than it was a few years ago, it is still a "significant
factor" to be considered in determining the custody of children.
567
The court stated that because the trial court had determined that
both parents were "fit, willing and able" to assume the custodial
role, the mother's homosexuality was the "overriding factor." ' 568
The supreme court expressed concern that the mother was
currently living with her lover in the same residence with the
children. 569  The court stated that, while the mother's
homosexuality could be beyond her control, living with another
woman in a sexual relationship was not something beyond her
control. 
57 0
The supreme court also stressed that if the children resided
with their mother, they could suffer societal disapproval to a
greater extent than if they resided with their father.57' The court
expressed concern that the children would have a day-to-day
confrontation with the problem of their mother's sexual preference
if they continued to reside with her and her lover.572 The supreme
court agreed with the trial court that there was insufficient expert
testimony to determine whether the children would have an
562. Id.
563. Id. The trial court stated that it could not be determined that the children would clearly be
better offwith one parent than the other and further stated that there would be less disruption of the
children if they were allowed to remain with their mother. Id.
564. Id. at 82.
565. Id. at 80. The supreme court stated that when reviewing a trial court's determination of
child custody in a divorce action, it treats these matters as findings of fact. The court further stated
that findings of fact cannot be "clearly erroneous. " Id.
566. Id.
567, Id. The supreme court went so far as to state that "Jilt is not inconceivable that one day our
society will regard homosexuality as 'normal. "' Id.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 81. The court stated that the fact that the two women were living together in the same
residence with the children was "material in this instance." Id.
570. Id. The court recognized the harshness of its approach, but implied that forcing the mother
to dissolve her living arrangement could be analogized to other "sacrifices" that other concerned
parents have been willing to make for their children. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id. The supreme court agreed with the trial Court's finding that the children would be
required to deal with the problem regardless of which parent obtained custody, but implied that the
children would be less burdened if they were living with their father. Id.
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increased likelihood of becoming either homosexual or bisexual as a
result of living with a homosexual parent.573 However, the supreme
court determined that the best interests of the children would be
better served by placing them with their father "because of the
mores of today's society, because [the mother] is engaged in a
homosexual relationship in the house in which she resides with the
children, and because of the lack of legal recognition of the status of
a homosexual relationship. . .. ,,574
GOVERNMENT
McCroskey v. Cass County
McCroskey v. Fettes
The North Dakota Supreme Court clarified the extent of
governmental immunity in North Dakota in two related cases. The
plaintiff in McCroskey v. Cass County [McCroskey I]"' and McCroskey v.
Fettes [McCroskey I]576 sought relief for damages allegedly resulting
when officials seized and detained him in county jail for
detoxification. 577 The circumstances from which both cases arose
began on December 5, 1978, when police officers observed a male
standing by a car in a downtown parking lot. 578 It was unclear at
that time whether the person was urinating, unlocking the car, or
tampering with the parked vehicle. 579 The officer asked the
individual to come and sit in the patrol car for observation. 580 The
officers then volunteered to give the man, identified as McCroskey,
a ride home or to call a cab for him, but McCroskey refused the
offers. 581 Consequently, the officers took McCroskey to the county
jail for detoxification. 58 2 McCroskey asserted that he was not
intoxicated and that, as a result of his detention, he "suffered great
physical and mental anguish, humiliation and shame, and was
deprived of his liberty and damaged in his name and
reputation. "583 McCroskey brought actions to recover for these
573. Id. The supreme court stated, however, that this issue did not control its conclusion. Id. at
82.
574. Id. With respect to the status of the mother's homosexual relationship, the supreme court
noted that neither North Dakota nor any other state recognizes a legal relationship between two
persons of the same sex. Id. at 81.
575. 303 N.W.2d 330 (N.D. 1981).
576. 310 N.W.2d 773 (N.D. 1981).
577. McCroskey v. Cass County, 303 N.W.2d 330,331 (N.D. 1981).




582. Id.; 303 N.W.2d at 331.
583. 303 N.W.2d at 331.
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damages against the municipal police officers who seized
McCroskey and their employer, the City of Fargo, in McCroskey
I/184 and against the officials of the county jail in which he was
detained in McCroskey 1.585 The trial court dismissed the actions,
ruling that governmental immunity existed. The trial court
determined that the injuries McCroskey claimed were not the type
of physical injuries under which state statutes allowed recovery
against the government and that the actions of the officials in this
instance were discretionary actions, in which governmental
immunity was permitted.
58 6
In McCroskey I the North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted
the term "personal injury" as it is used in section 32-12.1-02(4) of
the North Dakota Century Code which defines the type of injury
for which one can recover against a political subdivision. 587 The
court noted that legislative history showed that the phrase
"personal injury" had been chosen for section 32-12.1-02(4),
rather than the term "bodily injury." 588 The court also recognized
that authorities indicate that " 'personal injury'. . . is a broader,
more comprehensive and significant term than the definition of
'bodily injury' which encompasses only physical injuries to the
body. "589 Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that
the term "personal injury" as used in section 32-12.1-02(4) of the
North Dakota Century Code includes "physical injuries, disease,
584. 310 N.W.2d at 774.
585. 303 N.W.2d at 331.
586. Id. at 331-32.
587. Id. at 335-36. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-02(4) (Supp. 1981). Section 32-12.1-02(4)
provides as follows: '"Injury' means personal injury, death, or property damage. Personal injury
includes sickness or disease sustained by any person caused by a political subdivision or an employee
thereof...." Id.
588. 303 N.W.2d at 336. The court's discussion of the enactment of section 32-12.1-02(4) of the
North Dakota Century Code included the following:
The conference committee on H.B. 1071 was concerned about the costs and
availability of liability insurance for political subdivisions. In conjunction with this
concern, there was some discussion as to whether the recoverable injury under Ch. 32-
12.1 should be a "personal injury" or a "bodily injury." The conference committee
decided to use the term "personal injury" and that term ultimately became part of §
32-12.1-02(4), NDCC.
Id.
589. Id. The court indicated that:
Considerable authority exists for the proposition that a "personal injury"
encompasses recovery not only for physical injuries, but also for any affront or
detriment to the body, reputation or liberty or sense of enjoyment of persons. Rolette
County v. Western Casualty and Surety Company, 452 F. Supp. 125 (D.C.N.D. 1978):
Merimee v. Brumfield, 397 N.E.2d 315 (Ind. 1979); Levine v. Sherman, 86 Misc. 2d 997,
384 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1976); Robertsv. State, 57 OhioApp. 2d 77, 385 N.E.2d 634 (1978);
Mokry v. University qfTexas Health Science Center, 529 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975);
see, 5A Words and Phrases p. 17 et seq.; 32 Words and Phrases p. 437 et seq.
303 N.W.2d at 336.
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sickness, mental anguish and suffering. "590 The court cautioned,
however, that "to recover for any mental anguish and suffering,
there must be a direct causal connection between the alleged
injuries and the [nondiscretionary] acts of the political sub-
division .... ",591 The supreme court concluded that the claims for
relief in McCroskey I and McCroskey II, which were based on the
suffering of mental anguish, humiliation and shame were
encompassed in the term "personal injury" used in section 32-
12.1-02(4) and were proper.
5 92
Governmental liability is also limited by the rule that tort
liability will not be granted for actions which may be termed
discretionary. 593 The court in McCroskey I noted that it is not always
helpful to look at whether an activity was conducted at a planning
or at an operational level of government when determining if an
action was discretionary, although generally, activities at the
operational stage of an enterprise are considered
nondiscretionary. 594 The court recognized, however, that "some
discretion at the operational level may exist because of the pertinent
provisions of the applicable statutes and regulations. "595 In
McCroskey I the court observed that section 5-01-05.1 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides that once an apparently intoxicated
person is placed in a hospital or jail, the peace officer "shall notify
the intoxicated person's family as soon as possible. "596 This
required action offered no discretion for the peace officer who
seized McCroskey. 597 The court also analyzed the operating policy
of the county jail which providesjail officials guidance in the release
of those people accepted for detoxification. 598 The policy states that
a person jailed for detoxification may be released if the jail staff
believes that the family is capable of handling the situation, 599 or




593. N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-12.1-03(3) (Supp. 1981). Section 32-12.1-03(3) provides in part as
follows: "A political subdivision shall not be liable for any claim . ..based upon the exercise or
performance . ..or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary.function or duty. I ld. (emphasis
added).
594. 303 N.W.2d at 334.
595. Id.
596. Id. at 334 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-05.1 (1975) (emphasis added)). The court in
McCroskey II recognized that the important analysis was not whether the person's family was in fact
notified, but rather whether the officers knew that a family member had been contacted. 310 N.W.2d
at 775.
597. 303 N.W.2d at 335.
598. Id.
599. Id. The court indicated that the operating policy for the detention center provided the
following policy for release: "A subject may also be released to the person's family, whenever such
person no longer constitutes a danger to himself or others, or when center staff believes it to be in
their best interest and the family appears capable of handling the situation." Id.
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supervision, that the person is not intoxicated. 60 0 The court noted
that in either situation, decisions made by jail staff are
discretionary. 60 1 Before discretion may be exercised, however, it is
necessary for jail officials to make observations of the detained
person, determining his intoxicated state, his apparent danger to
himself and others, and the ability of his family to handle the
situation. 60 2  These observations by the jail staff are non-
discretionary duties. 60 3 In McCroskey I the court extended the duty
to make these observations to the police officers who initially seize
an apparently intoxicated person. 60 4 Thus, in McCroskey /and IIthe
court permitted the plaintiff to litigate claims for relief based upon
his mental distress caused by the breach of nondiscretionary
duties .605
State ex rel. Peterson v. Olson
In State ex rel. Peterson v. Olson 60 6 the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that actions of the Governor which expanded the duties
and increased the salary of the Lieutenant Governor were proper
and should not be restrained. 60 7 In 1981 the state legislature
enacted House Bill No. 1648 providing an appropriation of
$87,000 to be used by the Governor's office to defray expenses
incurred by the Lieutenant Governor in the performance of
additional duties delegated to him by the Governor. 60 8 After the bill
passed, the Governor assigned additional duties to the Lieutenant





604. 310 N.W.2d at 775.
605. Id. at 776; 303 N.W.2d at 337.
606. 307 N.W.2d 528 (N.D. 1981).
607. State ex rel. Peterson v. Olson, 307 N.W.2d 528, 537 (N.D. 1981).
608. Id. at 530. House Bill No. 1648, enacted by the Forty-Seventh Legislative Assembly of the
State of North Dakota, provides in relevant part as follows:
There is hereby appropriated out of any moneys in the general fund in the state
treasury, not otherwise appropriated, the sum of $87,000, or so much thereof as may
be necessary, to the governor's office for the purpose of defraying the expenses of
additional duties of the lieutenant governor prescribed by the governor for the
biennium beginning.July 1, 1981, and ending.June 30, 1983.
It is the intent of the legislative assembly to defray the expenses of the lieutenant
governor for additional duties as may be prescribed by the governor. The legislative
assembly finds the appropriation made in section 1 of this Act to be reasonable for
expenses of performing the full-time duties assigned to the lieutenant governor by the
governor.
1981 N.D. Sess. Laws 77.
609. 307 N.W.2d at 530. The duties delegated to the Lieutenant Governor included "assisting
in intergovernmental affairs; acting as a liaison between state, county, and city governments;
assisting in ceremonial functions; and assisting in economic development programs." Id.
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Department of Accounts and Purchases for an increase in the
Lieutenant Governor's monthly salary, using funds appropriated
to the Governor's office by House Bill No. 1648.610 Later, a
warrant check drawn upon these funds was prepared by the
Director of the Department of Accounts and Purchases and was
presented to the State Auditor and State Treasurer for their
approval and signatures, a required procedure pursuant to section
54-27-08 of the North Dakota Century Code.6 11 The State Auditor
and State Treasurer refused to approve and sign the check and,
therefore, it was not delivered to the payee, the Lieutenant
Governor. 612 The State Auditor and State Treasurer instead asked
the supreme court to prohibit the Director of the Department of
Accounts and Purchases from preparing similar checks drawn upon
funds appropriated to the Governor by House Bill No. 1648.613 The
North Dakota Supreme Court accepted original jurisdiction of the
matter.
614
The court initially addressed the question of whether article V,
section 7 of the North Dakota Constitution impliedly limited the
authority of the Governor to assign additional duties to the
Lieutenant Governor. 6 15 The State Auditor and State Treasurer
610. Id.
611. Id. Section 54-27-08 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in part as follows:
Except as otherwise provided, money shall be paid from the state treasury only
upon the warrant or order prepared by the treasurer. ... When such order and
warrant-check is signed by the state auditor the state treasurer shall accept such order
or warrant with his signature, making such order and warrant-check negotiable. No
warrant upon the treasurer shall be delivered or mailed to the payee or his agent or
representative until such warrant has been signed by the treasurer and entered on the
treasurer's books as a check drawn on a bank depository.
N.D. CENT. CORE 54-27-08 (Supp. 1981).
612. 307 N.W.2d at 530.
613. Id
614. Id. at 531. The court rationalized its acceptance of original jurisdiction when it stated:
The instant case involves matters which are publici juris, i.e., the sovereignty of the
State. the franchises or prerogatives of the State, or the liberties of its people are
affected. The State Auditor and the State Treasurer pose serious challenges to the
authority of the Governor to prescribe additional duties to the Lieutenant Governor,
as well as to the authority of the Legislature to appropriate funds to pay the Lieutenant
Governor for the additional duties he performs. Because these challenges relate to the
very foundation upon which the executive and legislative branches of government rest,
i.e.. the executive power of the Governor to prescribe duties to the Lieutenant
Governor under Article V, 5 7 of the North Dakota Constitution; and the authority of
the Legislature to pass all laws necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the North
Dakota Constitution under Article IV, § 42, we will exercise our original jurisdiction
over the matter.
Id,
615. Id. at 532. Article V, section 7 of the North Dakota Constitution provides, in pertinent
part:
The powers and duties of the lieutenant governor shall be to serve as president of
the senate. and he may, when the senate is equally divided. vote on procedural
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argued that the delegation of duties by the Governor to the Lieu-
tenant Governor was improper when the delegation was so great
that it changed the nature of the office from a part-time position to
a full-time position. 616 The court noted, however, that the general
terms of article V, section 7 of the North Dakota Constitution
granted the Governor broad authority to delegate duties to the
Lieutenant Governor. 61 7 The court recognized that these duties
''may well be such as to convert the position to a full-time one.'' 6 18
The court indicated that as long as the Governor did not delegate
duties explicitly reserved in the Constitution to himself, the
delegation was proper. 
619
The second issue addressed by the court in State ex rel. Peterson
was whether section 54-08-03 of the North Dakota Century Code,
which specifies a salary for the Lieutenant Governor, limits what he
may validly receive as annual compensation for his services.620 The
Governor argued that section 54-08-03 should be construed to
compensate the Lieutenant Governor only for the duties specifically
designated to him under article V, section 7 of the North Dakota
Constitution. 62 1 The State Auditor and the State Treasurer assert-
ed, however, that section 54-08-03 specifically compensated the
Lieutenant Governor "for all services performed by him. ",622 The
supreme court determined that it would be "unconscionable" to
allow the Governor to delegate additional duties to the Lieutenant
Governor without permitting a corresponding increase in
compensation. 623 The court, therefore, determined that section 54-
08-03 only "limit[s] the Lieutenant Governor in the compensation
he receives in performing his basic duty as presiding officer of the
Senate. ''624
A related problem the court resolved concerned whether
article V, section 14 of the North Dakota Constitution, which
provides that the salaries of public officials may not be increased
during their term in office, was violated by the appropriation in
matters, and on substantive matters if his vote would be decisive. Additional duties
shall be prescribed by the governor.
N.D. CONST. art. V, 7.
616. 307 N.W.2d at 532.
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Id. at 533.
620. Id. Section 54-08-03 of the North Dakota Century Code provides: "The lieutenant
governor shall receive an annual salary of nine thousand seven hundred thirty dollars for all services
performed by him." N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-08-03 (Supp. 1981) (salary of the lieutenant governor
effective until.January 1, 1985, is eight thousand dollars).
621. 307 N.W.2d at 533.




House Bill No. 1648.65 The court recognized that the funds
appropriated to the Governor in House Bill No. 1648 was an
increase in the Lieutenant Governor's salary and that it was made
during the Lieutenant Governor's term in office. 626 The court
disregarded the prohibition of article V, section 14, however, when
it stated that "if the additional duties imposed are not germane to
the office of Lieutenant Governor, [he] may receive additional
compensation for their performance." 62 7 The court noted that the
only duty germane to the office of Lieutenant Governor was the
duty of presiding over the Senate. 628 Therefore, the Lieutenant
Governor's increased compensation for additional duties assigned
by the Governor was not prohibited by article V, section 14 of the
North Dakota Constitution. 629 Accordingly, the court allowed the
Governor to expand the duties of the Lieutenant Governor and,
correspondingly, increase his salary .630
City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald
In City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald631 the court held that
municipal personnel files are public records and as such are open to
inspection by the public. 632 The City sought to prevent the
defendant newspaper from examining the personnel file of the
former city chief of police, who claimed that the newspaper had no
legitimate reason for inspecting the contents of his personnel file. 63 3
The City alleged that personnel files maintained by a municipality
did not constitute public records subject to disclosure under section
625. Id. Article V, section 14 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
Salaries of public officers shall be as prescribed by law, but the salaries of any of
the said officers shall not be increased or diminished during the period for which they
shall have been elected and all fees and profits arising from any of the said offices shall
be covered into the state treasury.
N.D. CONST. art V, S 14.
626. 307 N.W.2d at 534-35. The Lieutenant Governor assumed the duties of his office on
January 1, 1981, and House Bill No. 1648 was approved by the Governor on April 1, 1981. Id.
627. Id.
628. Id. at 535-36.
629. Id. at 536.
630. Id. at 537. In closing the court noted this:
[I it is the Governor, and not the Lieutenant Governor, who assigns the majority of the
duties which the Lieutenant Governor is to perform. Because the office of Lieutenant
Governor is basically dependent upon the office of Governor for the determiniation of
which duties the Lieutenant Governor is to perform, it was not improper for the
Legislature to appropriate the funds to the Governor's office.
Id.
631. 307 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1981).
632. City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, Inc., 307 N.W.2d 572, 578 (N.D. 1981).
633. Id. at 574. The former chief of police resigned from that position in 1973 and was a
candidate for the office of county commissioner of Grand Forks County. Id. at 573-74.
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44-04-18 of the North Dakota Century Code634 and article XI,
section 6 of the North Dakota Constitution.
635
The term "records" was not defined in the "access to public
records" statute. 636 The court found, however, that the legislative
history revealed that the legislature had intended to give the term
an "expansive meaning. "637 Because personnel files were not
specifically excluded from the statute, the term "record" included
personnel files maintained by the City. 638 The court thus rejected
the City's contention that public records were limited to those
records which are required by law to be kept and maintained. 639
The court concluded that a personnel file maintained by a
personnel director of a political subdivision is a public record open
for inspection to all members of the public, including the news
media. 640
INSURANCE
United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co.
In United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co. 6 4 1 the court
ruled that a justiciable controversy must exist between insurance
companies before a declaratory judgment may be maintained.
64 2
The controversy began when Marvin Schelske, a Cochran Electric
634. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-0"-18 (1978). Section 44-04-18 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides that:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all records of public or
governmenatal bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions or agencies of the state or any
political subdivision of the state, or organizations or agencies supported in whole or in
part by public funds, or expending public funds, shall be public records, open and
accessible for inspection during reasonable office hours.
Id. § 44-04-18(1).
635. 307 N.W.2d at 574. See N.D. CONST. art. XI..§ 6. Article X1. section 6 of the North Dakota
Constitution provides that:
Unless otherwise provided by law, all records of public or governmental bodies,
boards, bureaus, commissions, or agencies of the state or any political subdivision of
the state, or organizations or agencies supported in whole or in part by public funds,
or expending public funds, shall be public records, open and accessible for inspection
during reasonable office hours.
id.
636. 307 N.W.2d at 577.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 577-78.
639. Id. at 578.
640. Id.
641, 311 N.W.2d 170 (N.D. 1981).
642. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co.. 311 N.W.2d 170, 174 (N.I). 1980). Section 32-23-
02 of the North Dakota Century Code provides for declaratory.judgments. N.D. CENT. Cor+ § 32-
23-02 (1981).
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employee, was injured when the truck he was driving
overturned. 643 Although the truck was leased from Martin
Engineering, it appears that a part furnished by Cochran Electric
caused the truck to tip over. 644 Nevertheless, Schelske brought an
action against Martin Engineering alleging that Martin
Engineering was negligent. 645 A third party suit was then initiated
by Martin Engineering against Cochran Electric alleging that
Martin Engineering would be entitled to indemnity or contribution
if Schelske was successful in his tort action.
646
The third party action against Cochran was defended by
United Pacific Insurance Company under a reservation of rights
agreement. 647 United Pacific insured Cochran under a contractor's
general liability policy. 648 Aetna Insurance Company, however,
also insured Cochran, providing workmen's compensation and
employer's liability insurance. 649 United Pacific brought the
declaratory judgment action since both companies claimed that the
other was liable to defend and indemnify Cochran Electric.
650
Aetna claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction since the
controversy was not justiciable .651
In deciding whether the controversy was justiciable, the court
considered separately the duty to defend and the duty to
indemnify. 6 2 The duty to indemnify, the court stated, was merely
academic. 653 The court followed the Fifth Circuit's decision in
American Fidelity & Casualty v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmer's
Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 654 which held that the issue of liability
was not justiciable because liability for a loss may never arise. 655
Schelske's tort action against Martin Engineering was speculative
since the action was still pending. 656 Furthermore, liability would
not attach against Cochran Electric unless Martin Engineering
could successfully prove its third party claim. 657 The contingent








651. Id. at 172.
652. Id. See Smith v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 249 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1980) (the duty to
defend is separate from the duty to indemnify).
653. 311 N.W.2d at 173.
654. 280 F.2d 453 (5th Cir, 1960).
655. American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut.
Casualty Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 453, 461 (5th Cir. 1960).
656. 311 N.W.2d at 173.
657. Id. Martin Engineering's action was complicated because Cochran Electric claimed that
North Dakota's Workmen's Compensation laws barred the action. Id. The court, however, noted an
exception to the general rule barring indemnity. Where an independent contractual relationship
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nature of these claims led the North Dakota Supreme Court to
conclude that the issue of liability was not justiciable.
The court also held that the question of which company had
the duty to defend did not present a real controversy.658 The court
adopted the view that it is better to await final resolution of the
underlying action before determining the duty to defend issue. 659
It applied the test set out in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Transamerica
Insurance Co., 6 6 0 which requires a real controversy between the
parties. The determinative factor "is whether the declaratory
action will probably result in a just and more expeditious and
economical determination of the entire controversy. "661 The North
Dakota court stated that judicial economy would be fostered in the
case under consideration because the duty to defend and indemnify
could be determined in a single action. 662 Moreover, the court
would be provided with a broader foundation of factual
information if the underlying action was determined before the
duty to defend question. 663 As a result, the ultimate decision would
be more "just and expeditious."
664
Justice Vande Walle, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the duty to defend was not justiciable. 665 He argued
that the duty to defend was not speculative since the action against
Cochran Electric was pending. As a result, Justice Vande Walle
concluded that a present justiciable controversy existed. 66 6 In
addition, he stated that the result may not be "just" under the
Aetna Insurance Co. test cited by the majority if an insurance
exists between the third party, Martin Engineering, and the employer, Cochran Electric, indemnity
is allowed. Id. SeeWhite v. McKenzie Elec. Coop., Inc., 225 F. Supp. 940, 945-46 (D.N.D. 1964).
This issue added to the speculative nature of the underlying action.
658. 331 N.W.2dat 174.
659. Id. Courts are divided on the question of whether the duty to defend presents a real
controversy. Id. See 20 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 11354, at 348 (1980). The Eighth
Circuit follows the view that a controversy does exist. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Texas Co., 114
F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1940).
660. 262 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). North Dakota law states four requirements for
declaratory relief:
The requisite precedent facts or conditions which the courts generally hold must
exist in order that declaratory relief may be obtained may be summarized as follows:
(I) there must exist a justiciable controversy; that is to say, a controversy in which a
claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally
protectible interest; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for
iudicial determination.
Iverson v. Tweeden, 78 N.D. 132, 138, 48 N.W.2d 367, 370 (1951).
661. 311 N.W.2d at 147 (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 262 F. Supp. 731,




665. Id. at 174 (Vande Walle,.j., dissenting).
666. Id. at 175.
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company refuses to defend and the insured must defend himself.667
Justice Vande Walle also noted that judicial economy would not
always be fostered since a separate action could be required
anyway. 668 Justice Vande Walle's comments on judicial economy
suggest that even under the Aetna Insurance Co. test, it may be more
expeditious and economical to decide, before the underlying action,
which insurance company has the duty to defend.
669
American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dairyland Insurance Co.
In American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dairyland Insurance
Co.
6 7 0 Dairyland appealed from a district court declaratory
judgment. 671 The case involved a dispute between American
Hardware and Dairyland over which company was obligated to
defend and provide coverage in a negligence action that arose out
of an automobile accident.672 On December 7, 1976, Mary Rychart
selected a car at Rydell Chevrolet in Grand Forks to test drive.
673
Mary's mother and Reid Siewert, a Rydell salesman,
accompanied Mary on the test drive. 674 During that drive, Mary
was involved in an accident which killed her mother and injured
the salesman.67 5 Reid Siewert sued Mary and alleged that she was
acting as an agent of her father at the time of the accident. 676 Her
father, Emil Rychart, was the named insured under Daryland's
automobile liability policy. 6 77 American Hardware insured Rydell
Chevrolet under an automobile dealer's insurance policy.
6 78
American Hardware sought the declaratory judgment since both
parties disclaimed all contractual duties to Mary and Emil
Rychart.
679
The question in the case was whether Mary Rychart was an
insured under her father's policy with Dairyland. 680 Dairyland
667. Id
668. Id.
669. Id. In the test cited by the majority the "determinative factor is whether the declaratory
action will probably result in a just and more expeditious and economical determination of the entire
controversy." Id. at 174. This language arguably allows consideration of the duty to defend question
before the underlying action, as justice so requires.
670. 304 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1981).







677. Id. Emil Rychart was the named insured under his own automobile liability policy. Mary
Rychart, however, was not a named insured under that policy. Id.
678. Id.
679. Id.
680. Id. at 689.
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argued that Mary was not an insured under section V of the policy
entitled "Use of Other Automobiles. ' ' 68t That section stated that
the policy provided coverage for the named insured and "any other
person . . . only with respect to [the insured's] . . . liability because
of acts or omissions of [the] insured. "682
The district court applied Minnesota law because the parties
had stipulated that Minnesota law governed the Dairyland
insurance contract. 68 3 It held that Mary was a potential insured
under her father's policy since Siewert had alleged that she was
acting as her father's agent. 68 4 Her acts were arguably imputed to
her father, the named insured under section V, and, therefore, she
was also arguably covered under the language of section V.685 That
was important since, under Minnesota law, the duty to defend is
determined by the allegations of the complaint and the policy
provisions. 686 The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the
district court's analysis and reversed. 687  The court construed
section V so that it only covered Mary if her liability was based on
acts of the named insured. 688 The named insured, her father,
however, had not acted and was not negligent. 68 9 Mary's acts could
not be imputed to her father because only the agent's liability, and
not acts or omissions, transfer to the principal. 690 Dairyland was,
therefore, not obligated to defend or provide coverage for Mary
Rychart. 691 The result of the case would probably have been the
same under North Dakota law since the court did not apply any
Minnesota law when construing the policy.
681. id. Section V reads as follows:
If the named Insured is an individual or husband and wife and if during the policy
period such named insured, or the spouse of such individual if a resident of the same
household, owns a private passenger automobile covered by this policy, such
insurance as is afforded by this policy under coverages A, B and C, with respect to said
automobile applies with respect to any private passenger automobile subject to the
following provisions:
(a) Under coverages A and B the word 'insured' includes (1) the named
Insured and spouse provided his actual operation is with the permission of the
owner and is within the scope of such permission, and (2) any other person or
organization not owning or hiring the automobile, but only with respect to his
or its liability because of acts or omissions of an insured (a)(1 ) above.
Id.
682. Id. The court noted that section V was not a model of clarity, but that no issue of its
ambiguity had been raised. Id. at 690 n. 3.
683. Id. at 689.
684. Id.
685. Id.
686. Id. See Republic Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Buehl, 295 Minn. 327, 204 N.W.2d 426 (1973).
North Dakota courts also look to the allegations of the complaint to determine whether there is a duty
to defend. Kyllo v. Northland Chem. Co.. 209 N.W.2d 629. 63s (N.D. 1973).
687. 304 N.W.2d at 690.
688. Id. at 689,
689. Id.
690. Id. at 690.
691. Id.
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Finstad v. Steirer Tractor, Inc.
In Finstad v. Steiger Tractor, Inc. 692 the court reversed an order
granting a motion for a summary judgment. 693 The issue on appeal
was whether an insurer providing employee accident insurance
could deny a claim made by an employee beneficiary three years
and four months after the date of the loss. 694 Finstad, an employee
of Steiger Tractor, asserted that he was not aware of the group
insurance plan until immediately prior to serving notice of the
claim. 695 Stuyvesant, the company that wrote the insurance for
Steiger's employees, argued that the collective bargaining
agreement between Steiger and the employee's union placed
Finstad on notice that a group insurance plan existed. 696 That
agreement expressly referred to an insurance plan. 697
The court first considered whether noncompliance with the
policy notice provision had been excused. The policy expressly
required notice within twenty days "or as soon thereafter as is
reasonably possible."1 698 Nevertheless, the court cited authority
stating that, absent employee negligence, failure to give notice of a
claim within the time period set by the policy is excused when the
beneficiary did not know that the insurance policy existed. 699 The
court concluded that whether Finstad knew or should have known
that the policy existed was a question of fact.700 The collective
bargaining agreement, however, did not establish notice by
itself. 701
Finstad also argued that his late notice was excused because
Steiger had failed to deliver a certificate of insurance to him.70 2 The
policy stated that Stuyvesant would issue Steiger a description of
the benefits and that Steiger would deliver that certificate to each
insured employee.70 3 Finstad asserted that the insurance contract
692. 301 N.W.2d 392 (N.D. 1981).
693. Finstad v. SteigerTractor, Inc.. 301 N.W.2d 392, 393 (N.D. 1981).
694. Id. at 394. Each insured employee under the accident indemnity plan was a third-party
beneficiary. Therefore, each was entitled to enforce the policy to receive benefits. Id.
695. Id. at 393-94.
696. Id. The collective bargaining agreement outlined eligibility for the plan and benefits paid
by the plan, and stated that Steiger had paid for the plan. Id. at 394-95.
697. Id
698. Id. at 395.
699. Id.
700. Id. Evidence tending to show notice included the collective bargaining agreement and
receipt of a certificate of insurance, if applicable. Id.
701. Id.
702. Id. The certificate of insurance described the benefits to which the employee was entitled.
Id
703. Id. The policy provision reads as follows:
The Company [Stuyvesant i will issue to the Employer fSteigerl for delivery to each
Insured Employee an individual certificate describing the benefits to which the
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was breached because Steiger, acting as an agent for Stuyvesant,
had not delivered the certificate to him.70 4 The court stated that a
principal-agent relationship generally is not created between "the
insurer and the employer when a group insurance policy is
issued." 7 0 5 The court, however, proceeded to note that an agency
relationship between an insurer and employer could exist if the acts
of the employer served the insurer's purposes and the parties
intended to create such a relationship. 706 An agency relationship
would be important because section 26-06-09 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides that an insurer waives notice of loss if the
delay in presenting the notice is caused by "any act of the
insurer. "707 Since the question was a mixture of law and fact,
Finstad was entitled to a hearing on the merits.7 0
The court considered one additional question. If the lower
court determines that the insured did not comply with the policy,
must it also find that he forfeited all policy benefits? 70 9 Although
there are diverse views on this issue, the North Dakota court
decided to adopt the position followed in New .Jersey. 710 The
insurance company may not deny the benefits unless it can prove
that the policy notice provision was not complied with and that the
noncompliance created a likelihood of appreciable prejudice to the
company. 71 1 This rule is supported by the policy that it would not
be fair to deprive the insured of benefits under an adhesion contract
when the insurer had not been prejudiced by the delay. 712 The




Ex. rel. B. L.
In Ex. rel. B.L. 7 14 the court applied rules of statutory con-
Insured Employee is entitled under this policy and to whom payable and limitations
and requirements of this policy pertaining to the Insured Employee and where this
policy may be inspected.
Id.
704. Id.
705. Id. at 396.
706. Id. at 396-97.
707. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 26-06-09 (1978).
708. 301 N.W.2d at 397.
709. Id.




714. 301 N.W.2d 387 (N.D. 1981).
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struction to determine whether adult court or juvenile court has
jurisdiction over juveniles who have been issued a valid operator's
license or permit and have been charged with driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI).715 B.L. was sixteen
years old and a licensed North Dakota driver when she was arrested
for DWI.71 6 Due to recent amendments to the Uniform Juvenile
Court Act, 717 there was confusion as to which court, if any, had
jurisdiction in the case.718
A juvenile court in North Dakota has jurisdiction over any
child who is alleged to be delinquent, unruly, or deprived. 719 In
1977 the definition of a "delinquent act" in the Uniform Juvenile
Court Act720 was amended so that a child possessing a valid license
or permit and charged with DWI is not charged with an act within
the definition of "delinquent act," and, therefore, is outside the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 721 The problem appears in
sections 27-20-09 and 27-20-34 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 72 2 Section 27-20-09 states that an adult court must transfer
all criminal cases where a juvenile is the defendant to juvenile
court.7 23 Section 27-20-34 provides an exception in that it enables
an adult court to exercise jurisdiction where a child is the defendant
and the case has been properly transferred from the juvenile
court. 724 One of the conditions that must be met for a proper
transfer, however, is a petition alleging delinquency. 725 Since
children with licenses who are driving while intoxicated are no
longer committing a "delinquent act," a proper transfer is not
possible.726
715. Ex rel. B.L., 301 N.W.2d 387, 390-91 (N.D. 1981). Section 1-02-39 of the North Dakota
Century Code lists the proper rules for the court to apply in the construction of ambiguous statutes.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-02-39 (1975).
716. 301 N.W.2d at 388,
717. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-20 (1974 & Supp. 1981).
718. 301 N.W.2d at 388.
719. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-20-03 (1974).
720. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-20 (1974 & Supp. 1981). Section 27-20-02(3) of the North Dakota
Century Code now defines "delinquent act" as "an act designated a crime under the law . . . and
the crime . . . is not a traffic offense as defined in subsection 9." N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(3)
(Supp, 1981). Subsection 9 of section 27-20-02 was amended to define "traffic offense," rather than
"minor traffic offense," and provides:
"Traffic offense" means a violation of a law or local ordinance or resolution governing
the operation of a vehicle upon the highways of this state, or the waterways within or
adjoining this state, by a child who has been issued a valid operator's license or permit
if one is required, other than negligent homicide in violation of section 12.1-16-03 and
manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-20-02(9) (Supp. 1981).
721. 301 N.W.2d at 389.
722. Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE §S 27-20-09, -34 (Supp. 1981) (both sections discuss transfer
from other courts to juvenile courts).
723. 301 N.W 2d at 389.
724. Id.
725. Id.
726. Id. See N.D. CENT. CoDE § 27-20-02 (Supp 1981).
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The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the most
reasonable interpretation of the 1977 amendments to the Uniform
Juvenile Court Act is that the particular traffic offenses excluded
from the definition of "delinquent act" were intended to be heard
in an adult court. 727 The court concluded that the legislature
intended to create a situation where certain juvenile traffic
offenders, such as B.L., were to be dealt with in the same manner
as their adult counterparts. 
7 28
Ex. rel. P. W. N.
Ex. rel. P. W. N. 729 is an important elaboration of transfer
proceedings under the Uniform juvenile Court Act. 730 P.W.N. was
sixteen years old when he allegedly shot a county sheriff.731 On the
morning of the shooting P.W.N. was taken into custody, and the
juvenile court held an informal detention hearing. 732 Six days later
the county juvenile supervisor filed a request for transfer of:
jurisdiction from juvenile court to an appropriate court having
criminal jurisdiction over the offense charged. The juvenile court
issued an order which transferred jurisdiction to the county court.
P.W.N. appealed, asserting that hearsay evidence was improperly
received and considered by the juvenile court in making its decision
to transfer jurisdiction from juvenile court to adult court.
733
727. 301 N.W.2d at 390-91.
728. Id. at 391. The court also considered the obijects sought to be attained by the amendments,
the consequences ofa literal construction of the amendments, the preamble to the amendments, and
the legislative history of the amendments. Id. at 390-91.
729. 301 N.W.2d636 (N.D. 1981).
730. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-20 (1974 & Supp. 1981).
731. Ex rel. P.W.N., 301 N.W.2d 636, 637 (N.D. 1981). The detention hearing resulted in an
order for the further detention ofP.W.N. Id.
732. Id.
733. Id. at 638. Transfer hearings permit transfer to adult court for prosecution if the following
requirements of section 27-20-34(b) of the North Dakota Century Code are met:
(1) The child was fourteen or more years of age at the time of the alleged conduct;
(2) A hearing on whether the transfer should be made is held in conformity with
sections 27-20-24, 27-20-26, and 27-20-27;
(3) Notice in writing of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing is given to the child
and his parents, guardian, or other custodian at least three days before the hear-
ing; and
(4) The court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that:
(a) The child committed the delinquent act alleged;
(b) The child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile
through available programs;
(c) The child is not treatable in an institution for the mentally retarded or
mentally ill;
(d) The interests of the community require that the child be placed under legal
restraint or discipline; and
(e) If the child is fourteen or fifteen years old, the child committed a delinquent
act involving the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(b) (Supp. 1981).
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The supreme court held that hearsay evidence, in the form of
reports, may be used to establish reasonable grounds to believe that
P.W.N. was not amendable to treatment or rehabilitation as a
juvenile through available facilities; that P.W.N. was not treatable
in an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill; and that
the interests of the community required that P.W.N. be placed
under legal restraint or discipline.1 4 The hearsay evidence, in the
form of reports, was determined to be permissible because it was
practically necessary. 71 5 The court also held that P.W.N. was not
denied his constitutional and statutory rights to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against him because of the use of the hearsay
evidence. 73 6 The juvenile court relied on testimony of a live witness
available for cross-examination, and this testimony alone





In Gilbertson v. Charlson7 18 the North Dakota Supreme Court
interpreted a fifty percent mineral reservation. 73 9 In 1943 the state
issued a warranty deed to G. Thorlakson and reserved five percent
of the minerals.7 40 When G. Thorlackson died in 1947 his three
children each received an undivided one-third interest in ninety-
five percent of the minerals. 4 ' Two of the children, Charlson and
P. Thorlackson (Charlson), conveyed their interests to Gilbertson
"fr]eserving and excepting, however, to the Grantors fifty (50%)
Per Centum of all oil, natural gas and minerals. 7 42
The issue in Gilbertson was what percentage of the minerals
Gilbertson actually received after the transfer from Charlson.
Gilbertson argued that the grant from Charlson impliedly
warranted a fifty percent conveyance of the minerals and,
734. 301 N,',2d at 640, 642.
735. Id. at 640. The information in the reports was net essarv for the juvenile court to have a
complete picture of the issues. Id. To require live witnesses to convey first-hand knowledge of' the
incidents would he highly impractical. especially when these incidents occurred in anothcr
jurisdicon. Id.
736. Id. at 641.
737. Id.
738. 301 N.\V.2d 144 (N.D. 1981)
739. C;ilbertson %-. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144. 145 (N.D. 1981).
740. Id.
741. Id. They also each received an undivided ome-third interest in the surface. Id.
742. Id.
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therefore, her total interest would be eighty-one and two-thirds
percent of the minerals.143 This argument was based on an earlier
North Dakota Supreme Court grant interpretation in Kadrmas v.
Sauvageau74 4 in which the Duhig745 doctrine was applied.7 46 Charlson
argued that Kadrmas was inapplicable 47 and that by reserving fifty
percent of the minerals, they retained fifty percent of the
minerals. 748
The trial court gave summary judgment to Charlson, and the
supreme court affirmed. 749 The supreme court held that Charlson
retained fifty percent of the minerals by reserving fifty percent of
the minerals. 750 The court reasoned that Gilbertson's actual notice
of her thirty-one and two-thirds percent interest, constructive
notice of the five percent reservation to the state, and the fifty
percent reservation in the deed clearly made her aware that
Charlson was not impliedly warranting title to eighty-one percent
of the minerals. 75 1 Because of Gilbertson's notice of the outstanding
interests, the court refused to allow her to use the estoppel principle
used in Kadrmas. 712 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that
"should it be said that we are varying the Duhig doctrine referred to
and relied on in Kadrmas, we, to that extent, reject the Duhig
doctrine. "753
743. Id. at 146. The 813/1% is a merger of Gilbertson's 313/1% (Y, of 95%) and the 50%
allegedly conveyed. Id.
744. 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971). In Kadrmas the Kadrmases purchased property from the
Sauvageaus, and the deed reserved 50% of the minerals to the Sauvageaus. Kadrmas v. Sauvageau,
188 N.W.2d 753, 755 (N.D. 1971). The court held that the Sauvageaus were estopped from later
asserting their reservation to defeat the Kadrmases' claim of ownership of one-half of the minerals.
Id. at 756.
745. The Duhiq doctrine was derived from the case of Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135
Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). The North Dakota Supreme Court summarized Duhtq as follows:
In Duhti g, the grantor owned only one-half of the mineral interest in a parcel of
land. Subsequently, he conveved the land and reserved one-half of the minerals. The
Supreme Court of Texas determined that the grant warranted one-ialf of the mineral
interest. The court then applied the doctrine of estoppel to prevent the grantor from
asserting title to his reservation of one-half of the minerals in order to allow the grantee
to enjoy the one-half iineral interest warranted by the deced.
301 N.W.2d at 146 n.2.
746. 301 N.W.2d at 146.
747. Id. This agrument was based upon the fact that Gilbertson and Charlson were cotenants.
Id.
748. Id. at 148.
749. Id. at 145.
750. Id. at 148. The court noted that reservations should Ise iiterpreted in favor of the grantor,
Charlson. Id. See N.D. CENT. CoDE 5 47-09-13 (1978),
751. 301 N.W.2d at 148.
752. Id, The court stated that a party seeking estoppel must lack actual knowledge of the true
state of title and must he unable to acquire such knowledge. Id, See Gjerstadengen v. Hartzell. 9
N. ). 268, 276, 83 N.W. 230. 232 (1900).
753. 301 N.W.2d at 148. The court noted the "undercurrent of disfavor" with the Duhig
doctrine. Id. at 146 n. 2 (quoting I H. Wit.t mAstS & C. MFENT.RS. Ott ANo GAS LAW, § 311, at 578.33
(1978)).
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Norman Jessen &Associates, Inc. v. Amoco Production Co.
The issue in Norman Jessen &Associates, Inc. v. Amoco Production
Co. 7 54 centered on whether equitable considerations should be
allowed in the interpretation of an "unless" oil and gas lease.7 55 In
1972 Amoco obtained oil and gas leases from six lessors for one
section of land. 716 Each of the six lessors was paid a bonus, and each
was paid delay rental payments from 1973 to 1978. 757 However,
only four lessors actually owned oil and gas interests in the
property. 758 In 1979 the four lessors notified Amoco of the
deficiency in the delay rental payments, and they top leased 75 9 to
Norman Jessen.76 ° In 1979 Amoco paid the correct delay rental
payments,76t but the lessors returned the payments and requested
cancellation of Amoco's leases. 762 Norman lessen initiated an
action to quiet title to the oil and gas interests, and the trial court
ordered summary judgment for Norman Jessen. 763 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for trial.
764
The supreme court began its analysis with a consideration of
the "unless clause.'' 765 The court classified the clause as "a
limitation upon which the lease terminates if no drilling or payment
of delay rentals occurs.' 766 The court noted that courts have strictly
construed "unless" clauses and generally have not applied
equitable rules against forefeiture of the leases. 767 When deciding
whether the doctrines of estoppel and mutual mistake may apply to
an oil and gas lease with an "unless" clause, the North Dakota
754. 305 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1981).
755. Norman lessen & Assoc. Inc. v. Amoco Prod. Co.. 305 NW.2d 648, 651 (N.D. 1981).
The "unless" clause in Norman.lessen stated, in pertinent part: "If no well be commenced on said
land on or before the 14th day of September, 1973, this lease shall terminate as to both parties, unless
the lessee on or before that date shall pay or tender to the lessor... " Id. at 649 n. I (emphasis by
court). An "unless" clause is construed as a clause of special limitation upon which the lease
terminates if there is no drilling or payment of delay rentals. Id. at 651. The Norman lessen court
relied on two earlier cases, Woodside v. Lee, 81 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1957), and Schwartzenberger v.
Hunt Trust Estate, 244 N.W.2d 711 (N.D. 1976), and two oil and gas law authorities, 3 H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, Ott. AND GAS LAW 5 606 (1981) and 3 W. SIJMMERS, THE I.AW'or Ott AND
GAS § 452 (1958 & Supp. 1981). 305 N.W.2d at 651.
756. 305 N.W.2d at 649. The six lessors were the heirs of.John O'Brien. Id.
757. Id. The bonus paid each lessor was $533.34, and the delay rental payment paid to each
lessor was $106.67. Id.
758. Id, There were only four actual lessors because two of the heirs conveyed their interests in
oil and gas to the other four heirs by deed on December 5, 1968. Id.
759. The court stated the following definition of a top lease: "A lease granted by a landowner
during the existence of a recorded mineral lease which is to become effective if and when the existing
lease expires or is terminated. " Id. at 649 n.2 (quoting H. WttttAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF Ott
AND GAS TERMS 606 (4th ed. 1976)),
760. 305 N.W.2d at 649-50.
761. Id. at 650. The correct delay rental payment was $160.00. Id.
762. Id. The lessors filed demands for the release of the oil and gas leases pursuant to section 47-
16-36 ofthe North Dakota Century Code. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36 (Supp. 1981).
763. 305 N.W.2d at 650.
764. Id. at 649.
765. Id. at 650-51.
766. Id. at 651.
767. Id.
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court noted that the policy of strict construction of "unless" clauses
often results in the occurrence of harsh consequences. 7 6 The court
also noted that the argument for equitable relief is stronger when
the failure to make delay rental payments is a result of the lessors'
conduct. 769
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
estoppe 770 may be applied to a lease containing an "unless"
clause. 771 This conclusion was based, in part, upon Amoco's good
faith and the lessors' failure to object to the incorrect delay rental
payments. 772 The court also held that the doctrine of mutual
mistake 773 may be applied to a lease containing an "unless"
clause.77 This decision was based upon the policy that economic
waste would occur otherwise, as Amoco complied with the lease
and conducted seismograph operations on the leasehold. 775 Because
the court allowed consideration of equitable issues, it remanded the
Normanlessen case for trial. 776
Borth v. Gulf Oil Exploration & Production Co.
Borth v. Gulf Oil Exploration & Production Co. 177 was another
action in which the North Dakota Supreme Court considered the
termination of an oil and gas lease based upon improper payment
of delay rentals. In 1976 the Borths leased eighty acres to Batts. 778
The lease contained a typical "unless" clause. 779 Batts relied on a
title memorandum, concluded that the Borths only owned sixty
acres, and, therefore, paid them a bonus for sixty acres.780 Batts
assigned the lease to Gulf, and Gulf made delay rental payments in
1977 through 1979 based upon sixty acres. 7 81 In 1980 the Borths
768. Id. (citing3 H. W I. JANIS& C. MFYFRS, Ott. AN) GAS LAsW § 606.2 (1980)).
769. 305 N.W.2d at 651.
770. The doctrine ofestoppel is defined in section 31-11-06 of the North Dakota Century Code
as follows: "When a party, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately
has led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief
. 
he shall not be
permitted to falsif, it in any litigation arising out oftsuch declaration, act. or omission, " N.D. CENT.
Con .1- 11-06 (1976).
771. 305 N.W.2d at 652.
772. Id.
773. The North Dakota Century Code defines mistake of fact. Sec N.D. CE.Ntr. Con D. 9-03-13
(1975).
774. 305 N.W.2d at 653.
775. Id
776. Id.
777. 313 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1981).
778. Borth v. GulfOil Explor. & Prod. Co., 313 N.W.2d 706, 707 (N.). 1981)
779. Id. at 708. The lease provided that the lease would terminate ifdrilling was not commenced
or "unless the lessee... shall pay or tender to the lessor... ($160.00) which shall operate as a rental
and cover the privilege of deferring the commencement of operations lor drilling of a well for twelve




checked the title ownership and realized that they actually owned
eighty acres.78  The Borths demanded a release of the lease based
on the underpayment of delay rentals.78 3 When Gulf refused, the
Borths brought an action to cancel the lease. 78 4 The trial court
terminated the lease as to twenty acres and held the lease valid as to
sixty acres. 785 The supreme court affirmed.
78 6
The court began its analysis by noting that the lease contained
an "unless" clause and that generally equitable relief is not
available to alleviate the automatic termination of an "unless"
clause.787 The main issue the court considered was whether Gulf
could use equitable doctrines to stop the Borths from asserting
termination of the mineral lease. 78 8 The court found that both
parties were in error for not properly ascertaining the correct
number of acres in the lease. 7 89 It relied on two equitable maxims790
and concluded that the doctrines of estoppel, laches, and mutual
mistake were not available to Gulf to use in validating the entire
lease. 79 ' Because of the Borths' acceptance of partial delay rental
payments, the court did not believe the entire lease should be
terminated. 792 The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted a
unique remedy to deal with this fact situation. The court followed
the principle used by the Colorado Supreme Court in Kugrel v.
Young,7 9 3 and concluded that the lease was terminated as to twenty
acres and valid as to sixty acres. 7 94 The North Dakota court quoted
the Colorado case which declared that this result is not a judicial
modification of the lease, but rather a modification by the




784. Id. at 708-09.
785. Id. at 709.
786. Id. at 712.
787. Id. at 709. The court cited Norman lessen & Assoc. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 305 N.W.2d 648
(N.D. 1981), for these general principles, but did not use it later when it reached a result contrary to
Norman lessen. 313 N.W.2d at 709.
788. 313 N.W.2d at 710. The court specifically analyzed whether the doctrine of estoppel was
applicable. Id.
789. Id. at 711. Although the court found both parties at fault, it noted that the Borths did not
have high school educations and that Gulf should have examined the records available to them. Id. at
710. The court stated that Gulf relied on Batts, and Batts' conduct was chargeable to Gulf. Id.
790. Id. at 711. The court relied on the "clean hands" doctrine, Cross v. Farmers' Elevator
Co., 31 N.D. 116, 153 N.W. 279 (1915), and the maxim that provides that "[nlo one can take
advantage ofhis own wrong," N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-05(8) (1976). 313 N.W.2d at 711.
791. 313 N.W.2d at 711.
792. Id.
793. 132 Colo. 529, 291 P.2d 695 (1955).
794. 313 N.W.2d at 712.
795. Id. The Colorado court stated that when a lessor questions the amount of delay rentals
tendered by the lessee, the lessor should refuse the payments until he is certain. Id. at 711 (quoting
Kugel v. Young, 132 Colo. 529, __, 291 P 2d 695, 704 (1955)).
796. 313 N.W.2d at 712. The court also considered the after-acquired property doctrine and
concluded that it was inapplicable in this fact situation. Id.
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Amoco Production Co. v. North Dakota Industrial Commission
In Amoco Production Co. v. North Dakota Industrial Commission"'
the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed a spacing order
98 of
the North Dakota Industrial Commission (Commission). In 1979
the Commission held a hearing and changed the 320 acre spacing
in the Rattlesnake Point Field in the Duperow Pool in Dunn
County from laid down spacing to stand up spacing.79 9 This
decision was appealed to the district court. 800 The case was
remanded to the Commission, and a second hearing was held in
1980.801 The Commission affirmed its previous order.80 2 The
mineral owners, Lubkes, appealed, and the district court affirmed
the Commission's order.80 3 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the district court and the order of the
Commission. 804
The standard of review for reviewing Industrial Commission
orders is the "substantial evidence" test.80 5 The court considers
whether the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and agency
decisions are supported by substantial evidence.806 The supreme
court considered the testimony and exhibits before the Commission
in the Amoco case and concluded that the Commission acted
properly by ordering stand up spacing. 80
7
PROPERTY
Asleson v. West Branch Land Co.
In Asleson v. West Branch Land Co. 808 the supreme court
discussed whether a purchaser of real estate has a duty to discover
797. 307 N.W.2d 839 (N.D. 1981).
798. The Industrial Commission is required to set spacing units as necessary to protect
correlative rights. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-07 (Supp. 1981).
799. Amoco Prod. Co. v. North Dakota Indus. Comm'n, 307 N.W.2d 839, 840 (N.D. 1981).
Laid down spacing is the north half and south half of two adjacent quarters, and stand up spacing is
the east half and west hall of two adjacent quarters. Id.
800. Id.
801. Id.
802. Id. at 841,
803. Id.
804. Id. at 849,
805. Id. at 842. This test is stated in section 38-08-14(4) of the North Dakota Century Code,
"Orders of the commission shall be sustained if the commission has regularly pursued its authority
and its findings and conclusions are sustained by the law and by substantial and credible evidence."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-14(4) (1980).
806. 307 N.W.2d at 842. This three part test is explained in Bank of Hamilton v. State Banking
Bd., 236 N.W.2d 921,925 (N.D, 1975).
807. 307 N.W.2d at 843-49. The issue of the effective date of a pooling order was raised by the
Lubkes, but the court did not consider it. Id. at 848-49.
808. 311 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1981).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
errors made by a listing agent of a Multiple Listing Service (MLS).
The case arose when a purchaser sued for damages resulting from
his reliance on information in the MLS listing stating that the
property sold was zoned for thirty-five townhouses. 80 9 It was in fact
zoned for thirty, but this was not discovered until after the
purchase. The case was complicated by the fact that the purchaser
was also a real estate broker who was the MLS selling agent. 810
The court declined to apply case law from another jurisdiction
stating that listing and selling agents are jointly and severally
liable for damages.81 The court found that the purchaser's status
as a broker did not require imposition of a duty upon him to
discover the error. 81 2 In addition, the purchaser's reliance on the
information was deemed reasonable." 3 The court affirmed the
district court's award of damages 1 4 and based its decision on a
theory of constructive fraud. There does not appear to be any
previous North Dakota cases dealing with constructive fraud in a
real estate transaction. In this case there was constructive fraud,
even though there was no intent to deceive, because there was a
breach of duty owed to the purchaser by the seller which gave an
advantage to the seller.
81 5
Breene v. Plaza Tower Association
A North Dakota statute"t 6 requiring that restrictions which
encumber a condominium unit be recorded prior to a convey-
ance was construed in Breene v. Plaza Tower Association.8 7 The
plaintiff purchased a condominium unit when the con-
dominium's by-laws required a vote of three-fourths of the
owners to amend the by-laws. 818 The by-laws were subsequently
amended to forbid leasing the units, but this restriction was not
recorded with the register of deeds as statutorily required.81 9 The
supreme court upheld the district court's summary judgment
determination that the amendment was invalid. 820 The court
8019. Asleson v. West Branch Land Co., 311 N.W.2d 533. 535 (N.I). 1981).
810. Id. at 535, 539.
811. Id. at .539. The case mentioned which follows this rule is First Church of the Open Bible v.
(Cline.j. )unon Realtv. Inc., 19 Wash. App. 275,574 P.2d 1211 (1978).
812.311 N\VW 2d at 539.
813. Id. at 543.
814. Id. at 546. The court, however, decreased the award by one-half, apparently because ofihe
plaintiff's special knowlerlte as a broker. Id.
815. Id. at 537.
816. N.D. (:NT. C,0,. 47-04.1-04 (1978).
817. 310 N.V.2d 730 (N.I. 1981).
818. Breene \ . Plaza Tower As'n. 31(1 N.V.2d 730. 731-32 (N.D. 1981)
819. Id. at 732.
8201. M t 735.
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concluded that the provision for amendment of the by-laws did not
operate as a waiver of the statutory rights.8 21  The court
distinguished the statutes of other states which permit amendments
to the restrictions. 22 The court determined that amendments could
be adopted which would be enforceable against current owners, as
long as they fit within the narrow categories contained in section
47-04.1-07 of the North Dakota Century Code.
823
Production Credit Associaton of Mandan v. Terra Valle, Inc.
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
acquiescence established a boundary line in Production Credit
Association of Mandan v. Terra Valle, Inc. 824 A private survey showed
that a corner of a quarter had been misplaced since a 1928 county
survey and, as a result, three parties claimed title to a 23' x 575'
strip of land. 825 A fence had been placed along the old, presumed
boundary in 1948.826 The supreme court relied on the doctrine of
acquiscence to uphold the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants and intervenors who owned the
land that, according to the old boundry, included the disputed
strip.8 27 The court reasoned that the doctrine of acquiscence had
been satisfied because the fence had been intended as a boundry
and because the defendants and intervenors had been in constant
possession of the strip of land for more than the twenty year statute
of limitation.8 28 The court noted that knowledge of the true
boundary line was unnecessary when establishing a boundary by
acquiescence. 
8 29
Allen v. MinotAmusement Corp.
In Allen v. Minot Amusement Corp.830 the issue was whether
acquiescence to a different use of restricted property constituted
either a modification of a restrictive covenant or a waiver as to a use
not within the restrictive covenant. 831 Allen constructed a shopping
821. Id. at 734.
822. Id. These states are California and Florida.
823. Id. The categories include "maintenance of common elements, limited elements where
applicable, assessment of expenses, payment of losses, division of profits, disposition of hazard
insurance proceeds and similar matters." Id. See N.D. CENT. ConE § 47-04.1-07 (1978).
824. 303 N.W.2d 79 (N.D. 1981).
825. Production Credit Ass'n ofMandan v. Terra Valle. Inc.. 303 N. W.2d 79, 80 (N.D. 1981).
826. Id. at 81.
827. Id. at 86.
828. Id.
829. Id. at 84.
830. 312 N.W.2d 698 (N.D. 1981).
831. Allen v. Minot Amusement Corp., 312 N.W.2d 698, 701 (N.D. 1981).
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center and leased a major portion of it to Nash Finch. 832 The lease
contained restrictions on the types of other tenants who would be
allowed to lease.8 33 Nash Finch subsequently approved a use which
was not in the restriction, a motion picture theater. 834 The theater
was also given an easement for parking. 835 The theater was later
sold to a church, and Allen and Nash Finch sought, but were
denied, an injunction to enforce the use restrictions.
8 3 6
In finding no modification or waiver of the restrictive
covenant, the supreme court relied on a letter from Nash Finch
which allowed the use as a theater. The letter contained language
which stated, in effect, that consent was given for the operation of a
theater with the understanding that it did not operate as a waiver of
the covenant. 837 Although the letter was not recorded, the court
found the church had constructive knowledge of the original
restriction.8 38 Because of this knowledge, the church had a duty to
inquire as to the extent of Nash Finch's acquiescence.8 39 The court
concluded that the occupiers of the theater had an easement to use
the parking lot. The users, however, had to comply with the
restrictive covenant 84 0 and, therefore, could not use the building as
a church.
Keidel v. Rask
In Keidel v. Rask8 41 the supreme court held that the width of a
prescriptive road is to be determined from the width of the portion
of the road actually traveled, as well as the shoulders and ditches
needed and actually used to support the traveled portion. The case
involved a second appeal concerning the same road.8 42 The trial
court determined the road's width was sixty feet. 843 The supreme
court relied on a Minnesota case, Barfnecht v. Town Board of
Hollywood Township, 84 4 in concluding that the prescriptive width
must be determined by actual use. 845 Because the district court
832. Id. at 699.
833. Id
834. Id. at 700.
835. Id.
836. Id. at 701.
837. Id. at 702.
838. Id. The court concluded that the district court's finding of constructive knowledge was not
clearly erroneous. Id.
839. Id. at 703.
840. Id. at 704.
841. 304 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1981).
842. Keidel v. Rask, 304 N.W.2d 402. 403 (N.D. 1981). The previous case, Keidel v. Rask. 290
N.W.2d 255 (N.D. 1980), found that there was a prescriptive road.
843. 304 N.W.2d at 403.
844. 304 Minn. 505, 232 N.W.2d 420 (1975).
845. 304 N.W.2d at 409.
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appeared to rest its findings on the requirements of a city ordinance
which was inapplicable to this road and the testimony of witnesses
who claimed the width of sixty feet was necessary for maintenance
and safety, the supreme court remanded the case. 846 On remand
the district court is to determine the actual width of the road as used
during the prescriptive period. 847
TAXATION
Mills v. Board of County Commissioners
In Mills v. Board of County Commissioners8 4 8 the supreme court
examined the definition of "farmer" in chapter 57-02 of the North
Dakota Century Code.8 49 The main issue in Mills involved the
taxation of a home. 850 The appellant claimed her home was exempt
from property taxes under section 57-02-08(15) of the North
Dakota Century Code.8 51 This section provides a tax exemption for
farm structures and improvements located on agricultural land.
852
The supreme court reviewed the findings of fact and conclusions of
law made by the Board of Tax Appeals. 853 It determined the Board
was incorrect when it held the appellant's home qualified for the
846. Id. at 409-10.
847. Id. at 410.
848. 305 N.W.2d 832 (N.D. 1981).
849. Mills v. Board of County Comm'rs, 305 N.W.2d 832, 833 (N.D. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE
ch. 57-02 (1972 & Supp. 1981). The court also examined the procedures governing review ofa North
Dakota Tax Appeals Board decision. 305 N.W.2d at 833.
850. 305 N.W.2d at 833.
851. Id. at 835. Section 57-02-08(15) of the North Dakota Century Code provides that the
following property is exempt from taxation:
a. All farm structures, and improvements located on agricultural lands. This
subsection shall be construed to exempt farm buildings and improvements only...
b. It is the intent of the legislative assembly that this exemption as applied to a
residence shall be strictly construed and interpreted to exempt only a residence
which is situated on a farm and which is occupied or used by a person who is a
farmer and that the exemption shall not be applied to property which is occupied
or used by a person who is not a farmer. For purposes of this subdivision:
(1) "Farm" means a single tract or contiguous tracts of agricultural land
containing a minimum of ten acres [4.05 hectares] and which normally
provides a farmer, who is actually farming the land or engaged in the raising of
livestock or other similar operations normally associated with farming and
ranching, with not less than fifty percent of his annual net income.
(2) "Farmer" means an individual who normally devotes the major portion of his
time to the activities of producing products of the soil, poultry, livestock, or
dairy farming in such products' unmanufactured state and who normally
receives not less than fifty percent of his annual net income from any one or
more of the foregoing activities; and the term also includes an individual who is
retired because of illness or age and who at the time of retirement owned and
occupied as a farmer as defined above the residence in which he lives and for
which the exemption is claimed.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-08(15) (Supp. 1981).
852. Id.
853. 305 N.W.2d at 834.
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farm dwelling exemption found in section 57-02-08(15) of the
North Dakota Century Code.8 54 The supreme court thus affirmed
the holding of the district court. 855 The court focused on the
requirement that only a residence "which is occupied or used by a
person who is a farmer"8 56 should qualify for the exemption.8 5 7 The
court noted the statute defines "farmer" as an individual "who
normally devotes the major portion of his time to the activities of
producing products of the soil, poultry, livestock, or dairy
farming." 858 The court held that although the appellant resided on
the land, spent the major portion of her time on it, and derived the
majority of her income from the sale of firewood cut from it, she
was not necessarily a farmer. 859 The court noted that section 57-02-
08(15) of the North Dakota Century Code requires a strict
construction of the exemption statute when it is applied to a
residence and held that the appellant had not met the burden of
establishing that she was a farmer.
8 60
Paluck v. Board of County Commissioners
In Paluck v. Board of County Commissioners861 the court held that
the statutes creating the Board of Tax Appeals were
unconstituional under the North Dakota Constitution. 862 In
attempting to find a constitutional construction of chapter 57-23.1
of the North Dakota Century Code,8 63 which creates the Board of
Tax Appeals, the court explored the possibilities that the Board be
considered a court or an administrative agency.8 64 The supreme
court found chapter 57-23.1 unconstitutional under either
construction. 
8 65
The statute was unconstitutional if the Board was considered a
court because of a provision which existed in the North Dakota
Constitution at the time chapter 57-23.1 was enacted. 866 That
854. Id.
855. Id. at 832.
856, N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-02-08(15) (b) (Supp. 1981).
857. 305 N.W.2d at 835.
858, Id. at 836. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-02-08(15)(b)(2) (Supp. 1981).
859. 305 N.W.2d at 836.
860. Id.
861. 307 N.W.2d 852 (N.D. 1981).
862. Paluck v. Board ofCounty Comm'rs, 307 N.W.2d 852, 858 (N.D. 1981).
863. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 57-23.1 (Supp. 1981).
864. 307 N.W.2d at 855-58.
865. Id. at 855, 857.
866. Id at 855. At the time the Board of Tax Appeals was created, North Dakota's Constitution
contained the following provision:
The judicial power of the State of North Dakota shall be vested in a supreme
court, district courts, county courts, Justices of the peace, and in such other courts as
may be created by law for cities, incorporated towns and villages.
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provision did not permit the creation of special courts by the
legislature. 67 The court held that chapter 57-23.1 was also
unconstitutional if the Board was viewed as an administrative
agency.168 The court recognized that quasi-judicial powers may be
delegated to an administrative agency where adequate standards
have been established by the legislature.8 69 But, the court held that
because the Tax Appeals Board was given no statutes to
administer, it exercised solely judicial functions.870
Sunbehm Gas, Inc. v. Conrad
In Sunbehm Gas, Inc. v. Conrad"t appellants requested a writ of
prohibition against the State Tax Commissioner to restrain him
from collecting oil extraction taxes under Initiated Measure No.
6.872 The appellants raised three issues. The first issue was whether
Initiated Measure No. 6 appropriated public monies and thereby
interfered with the legislature's appropriation authority in violation
of article X, section 12(1) of the North Dakota Constitution. 73 The
second issue was whether Initiated Measure No. 6 hampered,
restricted, or impaired the legislature's power of appropriation in
violation of article III, section 1 of the North Dakota
Constitution. 87 4 The final issue was whether Initiated Measure No.
6 embraced more than one subject in violation of article IV, section
33 of the North Dakota Constitution. 
875
The court held that Initiated Measure No. 6 was
constitutional.8 76 It first held that although Initiated Measure No. 6
allocated or divided oil extraction tax funds among the various
objectives of the measure, it left the appropriation of such funds for
legislative action. 877 Next, the court held that Inititated Measure
No. 6 did not hamper, restrict, or impair the legislature's
N.D. CONST. art. IV, 5 85 (1889, amended 1976). In 1976 the electorate repealed the entire judicial
article of the constitution and replaced it with a new judicial article. 307 N.W.2d at 855. Under the
new judicial article the legislature does have the power to create special courts. Id. However, in
Paluck the court held that the constitutionality of chapter 57-23.1 must be tested under the
constitution in effect when the chapter was enacted. Id. at 858.
867. 307 N.W.2d at 855.
868. Id. at 857.
869. Id. at 856.
870. Id. at 857.
871. 310 N.W.2d 766(N.D. 1981).
872. Sunbehm Gas, Inc. v. Conrad, 310 N.W.2d 766, 767 (N.D. 1981). See 1981 N.D. Sess.
Laws 1806-10.
873. 310 N.W.2d at 768. SeeN.D. CONST. art. X, S 12(1).
874. 310 N.W.2d at 768. SeeN.D. CONST. art. III, 51.
875. 310 N.W.2d at 768. See N.D. CONST. art. IV, §33.
876. 310 N.W.2d at 773.
877. Id. at 770.
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appropriation power.878 Finally, the court held that Initiated
Measure No. 6 did not embrace more than one subject. 87 9 The
court found that each section of the measure dealt with matters
which were related to, or were in consequence of, the imposition of
the oil extraction tax.
880
TORTS
,Johnson v. Monsanto Co.
In Johnson v. Monsanto Co. 881 the supreme court set aside a jury
money verdict rendered against a herbicide manufacturer for
tortiously injurying the plaintiff's wheat crop.88 2  The court
concluded "that the damage award of the jury was excessive and
without support in the evidence. "883
The court rejected Johnson's contention that his recoverable
damages were-not limited to the general measure of damages for
injury to a growing crop - the probable value of the crop at
maturity less the actual value at maturity and a further reduction
for expenses not incurred. 884 The court held that.Johnson was not
entitled to an additional recovery for losses allegedly attributable to
the replacement crops which he planted after the injury to his wheat
crop. 88 5 The court concluded that these were "special damages," 8 6
and, therefore, they were not recoverable because . ohnson had not
proven them to a reasonable degree of certainty and because they
were too remote.
88 7
The court also rejected Johnson's contention that he was
"entitled to recover the cost of herbicide, costs of incorporating the
878. Id. at 771.
879. Id. at 773.
880. Id.
881. 303 N.W.2d 86 (N.D. 1981).
882.Johnson v. Monsanto Co., 303 N.W.2d 86, 95 (N.D. 1981). The court reversed the verdict
as to the amount of damages and remanded with an offer of remittitur. Id.
883. Id. The jury found that the total damages suffered by the plaintiff was $23,786.00. Id. at
91. The supreme court found that the proper measure of damages was $6,693.60. Id. at 92.
884. Id. at 92-95. The general perimeters for damage which are recoverable for torts are found
in section 32-03-20 of the North Dakota Century Code. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-20 (1976). Section
32-03-20 provides: "For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of
damages, except when otherwise expressly provided by law, is the amount which will compensate for
all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not." Id.
885. 303 N.W.2d at 93. Johnson destroyed the damaged wheat crop and in its place planted
sunflowers and flax. Id. at 90. The special damages .Johnson sought were for damages from the
interruption of proper rotation of his crops including "loss of [soill moisture, loss of opportunity to
plant sunflowers next year, costs of incorporating the sunflower stalks into the soil. " Id. at 93.
886. Id. The court stated that "special damages include items of loss which are peculiar to the
plaintiffs and would not be expected to occur regularly to other plaintiffs in similar circumstances."
Id.
887. Id. The court stated that special damages are recoverable if the amount of damage is
proved with a "reasonable degree of certainty" and the damages are not "too remote." Id.
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herbicide into the soil structure, and the costs of planting the
wheat. '"888 The court reasoned that recovery for these expense
items would provide restitutionary relief, a remedy foreclosed to
Johnson because of his election to pursue a damage remedy. 889
Finally, the court held that Johnson could not recover the costs of
his normal farming operations in planting the wheat crop because
they were not expenses caused by the defective herbicide. 890
888. Id. at 94.
889. Id. The court stated that damages and restitution are inconsistent remedies for the same
inlurv. Id. (citingAnders v. Dakota Land and Dev. Co.. 289 N.W.2d 161 (Minn. 1980)).
890. 303 N.W.2d at 94. They were expenses "which [Johnsoni would have incurred without
regard to the damage caused by the defective herbicidc." -d.
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